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Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been the leading actors in the process
of globalization of the last three decades. According to UNCTAD, exports of
foreign affiliates of MNEs constitute about one third of total world exports of
goods and services, and one third of international trade is intra-firm trade. In
2009, foreign affiliates employed about 80 million people – four times more
than in 1982 – and their contribution to world GDP reached, despite the
slowdown in economic activity caused by the global crisis, a new maximum
of 11% (see UNCTAD 2010).
The phenomenal increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows came along
with a proliferation of policy instruments to protect – and attract – foreign
investors. The number of international investment agreements (IIAs), the
most important being bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double tax-
ation treaties (DTTs), grew exponentially since the early 1960s (see Sachs
and Sauvant 2009). While BITs principally aim at protecting foreign invest-
ments, DTTs deal with the allocation, between host and home countries, of
taxable capital flows (dividends, interest, and royalties) generated by MNEs,
xi
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and intend to reduce investors’ costs of tax compliance. The surge of DTTs
signed not only reflects – as in the case of BITs – the countries’ efforts to
attract FDI by avoiding double taxation; it also reflects the growing effort
made by developed countries coordinate anti-tax-avoidance measures.
The increased mobility of capital, made possible by the liberalization of regu-
lations and the development of communication technologies, poses a challenge
to national tax systems. Moving actual or recorded activity – i.e. taxable
profits – across jurisdictions became easier and less costly, increasing both
the sensitivity of real capital or paper profits to tax differentials, and the
competition among jurisdictions for either of them. Attempts to relieve the
resulting jurisdictional tax conflicts have been made not only through bilat-
eral tax treaties but also through initiatives to coordinate tax rules within
the OECD and the EU (see Griffith, Hines and Sørensen 2010). While pro-
posals for partial harmonization of corporate tax rates within the EU failed,
the number of tax-related cases presented at the European Court of Justice
increased significantly in the last years, as international companies consider
national tax rules discriminating and infringing on their fundamental free-
doms guaranteed by the EU Treaty (free movement of goods, services, capital
and persons).1
In this context, it is of great relevance to the policy maker to learn about
multinational firms’ responses to tax instruments and to quantify those re-
1See European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/common/infringements/
case law/court cases direct taxation en.pdf.
Introduction xiii
sponses. There is now a vast literature on the responsiveness of FDI to
taxation. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) provide a survey and a meta-study
of the literature and document a big variance of the estimated profit tax elas-
ticities of FDI across studies. Griffith, Hines and Sørensen (2010) consider
the existing empirical evidence on corporate taxation in the open economy,
and conclude that “[...] while we can say that tax policy is important, we are
unable to say precisely how strongly international real investment will react
to specific changes in national policies”.
This dissertation contributes to the empirical literature on multinational firm
behavior by using state of the art econometric methods, and an exception-
ally good data-set on foreign affiliates’ balance sheets, to assess the impact
of different policy instruments on different margins and outcomes of MNE
activity in four self-contained chapters. The data used is the Microdatabase
Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The fea-
ture of the data-set that makes it especially apt for evaluating the sensitivity
of MNE activity to policy instruments, is that reporting is mandatory above
a threshold set by law (See Lipponer, 2009, for details). In fact, MiDi com-
prises both the universe of foreign affiliates in Germany and the universe
of German affiliates abroad. In its current version, the data-set is available
as a panel over the period 1996-2009. Since Germany is not only one of the
most important home economies, but also a major recipient of foreign invest-
ments,2 we observe a significant sample of the world’s MNEs, rendering the
estimated responses to policy instruments highly relevant for the evaluation
2In 2009, Germany ranked fourth and seventh in terms of FDI outflows and inflows
respectively (see UNCTAD 2010).
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of the effectiveness of such policies.3
The first chapter is concerned with the location of foreign investments within
Germany, and their sensitivity to the local municipal business tax rate. The
main contribution of this chapter is the compilation of a panel data-set of
more than 11, 000 of the 12, 300 German municipalities, which is linked to the
location of inbound FDI in Germany to assess the impact of profit taxation on
multinational firm activity in a sub-national context. Most existing empirical
evidence on the impact of profit taxation on multinational firm activity is
based on cross-country data. One major drawback of such data is that coun-
tries differ not only with regard to taxes but along other dimensions which
might be hard to capture by means of observable characteristics. We show
that – after controlling for other determinants of firm location decisions –
higher business tax rates have a negative effect on three alternative measures
of MNE activity: the number of foreign MNEs, MNE employment, and MNE
fixed assets. Our results suggest that tax competition among regional entities
for foreign investors is a game of a few. We find that a one-percent reduction
of the municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a decline by about 0.14
percentage points) leads to an increase in the number of legally independent
foreign-owned firms by about 0.45. The average municipality would have to
reduce its business tax rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from its
average level to attract one foreign MNE. Hence, municipalities need to be
3Throughout all chapters, we strive to make the least restrictions to the samples as
possible, the main reason for such restrictions being the lack of data on some control
variables. In Chapter 4, for example, we have a sample of 38,705 German foreign affiliates.
These represent almost 5% of the world’s foreign affiliates, which are estimated to amount
to 810,000 (See UNCTAD 2009).
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attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract
firms at the margin.
The remaining chapters focus on the location and activity of German foreign
affiliates abroad. Chapter 2 is dedicated to the analysis of bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs), one of the few policy instruments that are directly
intended to attract foreign investments. Previous research aimed at a quan-
tification of the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment at aggregated
levels only. We use the data at hand to deliver a detailed analysis of BITs’
effects on multinational activity at the micro level, and contribute to improv-
ing our understanding of the precise channels through which BITs determine
aggregate investment. We provide descriptive evidence on changes in inten-
sive and extensive margins of multinational firm activity around the adoption
of BITs. The results of multivariate empirical models broadly support the
hypotheses derived from a parsimonious model of heterogeneous firms on the
effects of BITs on different margins of investment: BITs raise the number of
multinational firms active in a particular host country and have a positive
effect on the number of plants per firm, as well as on FDI stocks and fixed
assets per firm.
In Chapter 3 we turn the attention back to corporate profit taxation. This
chapter analyzes the impact of statutory corporate tax rates and of double
taxation treaties (DTTs) on multinational firm activity at the micro level. It
provides an assessment of the effects of these profit tax instruments on the
extensive and the intensive margin of MNE activity. While we can expect
statutory corporate tax rates to have a negative effect on FDI, the effect
Introduction xvi
of DTTs is not a priori clear. On the one hand, DTTs typically reduce
uncertainty about after-tax profits by specifying the mode of taxation relief
and by agreeing on maximum levels of withholding tax rates. At the same
time, they contain provisions for the exchange of information to limit transfer
pricing, and restrict tax evasion, which might rather discourage FDI. Our
findings suggest that while statutory tax rates affect MNE activity negatively
both at the extensive and the intensive margin of investment, DTTs primarily
induce a positive effect at the extensive margin.
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on the (unobserved) profit-shifting activities of
MNEs. In particular, the chapter investigates the tax responsiveness of multi-
nationals’ investment decisions in foreign countries, distinguishing firms that
are able to shift profits (shifters) from those that are not (non-shifters).
From a theoretical point of view, the tax responsiveness of firms crucially
depends on this distinction. Empirically, however, a firm’s ability to shift
profits is inherently unobserved. To address this problem, we use a finite
mixture modeling approach which allows us to distinguish shifters from non-
shifters stochastically from a mixture of distributions of the two types of
firms. We find that shifters do not respond to host-country profit taxes at
all, as expected, while taxes affect the investment decision of non-shifters.
More specifically, we identify a larger group of affiliates with a relatively low
average investment, which is negatively affected by the local corporate tax
rate on profits. The estimated tax effect for the latter group amounts to
1.85% less fixed assets, or 68,000 Euro for the average affiliate per percent-
age point tax increase. A smaller group of affiliates is able to avoid taxation
by shifting its tax base, and shows no significant response to corporate tax
Introduction xvii
rates. The affiliates in this group have, on average, significatively higher in-
vestments in fixed assets, so that – were they to be prevented from shifting
profits – the implied effect in Euro of a one-percentage-point change in the
tax rate would be 42 times higher. We conclude that, to the extent that
a considerable proportion of a country’s foreign investments are carried out
by firms that shift profits, the introduction of anti-tax-avoidance measures
to restrict profit shifting in the pursuit to cash tax revenue will come at the
cost of entering in tax competition with other countries for that firms’ in-
vestments. In fact, the broadening of the tax base has to be accompanied
by a policy of cutting the statutory tax burden to avoid losing real economic
activity.
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Abstract∗
Most existing empirical evidence on the impact of profit taxation on multi-
national firm activity is based on cross-country data. One major drawback
of such data is that countries differ not only with regard to taxes but along
other dimensions which might be hard to capture by means of observable
characteristics. We compile a database of more than 11, 000 municipalities
in Germany to analyze the sensitivity of location decisions of foreign MNEs
in Germany with respect to business tax rates which are levied directly by
the municipalities. We find that higher business tax rates have a negative
effect on three alternative measures of MNE activity, after controlling for
other determinants of firm location decisions: the number of foreign MNEs,
MNE employment, and MNE fixed assets. Our results suggest that tax com-
petition among regional entities for foreign investors is a game of a few. In
cross-section instrumental-variables regressions, a one-percent reduction of
the municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a decline by about 0.14 per-
centage points) leads to an increase in the number of legally independent
foreign-owned firms by about 0.45. The average municipality would have to
reduce its business tax rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from its
average level to attract one foreign MNE. Hence, municipalities need to be
attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract
foreign firms at the margin.
1.1 Introduction
A sizable literature in theoretical public finance argues that the location of
capital in general and that of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in particular
reacts sensitively to profit tax policy (Wilson, 1987; Janeba, 1995; Huizinga
∗This chapter is joint work with Sascha Becker and Peter Egger. It is based on our
paper “How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity: Municipality-Level Evidence
from Germany”. An earlier version is available as CESifo Working Paper No. 2517.
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and Nielsen, 1997; Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Wilson, 1999; Ludema and
Wooton, 2000; Davies, 2003, 2005; Devereux and Hubbard, 2003; Baldwin
and Krugman, 2004; Raff, 2004; Borck and Pflüger, 2006; Bucovetsky and
Haufler, 2008; this list is by no means exhaustive). When lumpy investment
– i.e., firm or plant location – is sensitive to profit taxation, many of these
models predict a race to the bottom in profit tax rates so that, in equilibrium,
countries have to offer a tax rate of zero to attract investors. Otherwise, a
jurisdiction will lose the whole profit tax base to its competitors. One key
reason for this outcome is that – in most of the traditional models of tax
competition – countries differ only in terms of profit taxes or, more precisely,
low profit taxes are the only attraction governments may offer to firms.
Empirically, there is hardly any evidence of a race to the bottom in profit
taxes (except for the existence of a few small tax havens). Therefore, re-
cent theoretical work suggested mechanisms to avoid this knife-edge case.
The New Economic Geography literature hypothesizes that there are factors
generating agglomeration economies which, in turn, reduce the sensitivity of
location decisions of foreign MNEs with respect to profit (or capital) taxa-
tion (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and
Pflüger, 2006). More generally, taxes are only one factor affecting firm lo-
cation. There is little reason for a municipality to eliminate profit taxes
provided that the overall environment – e.g. available infrastructure and hu-
man capital endowment of the work force – makes it attractive enough to
locate there.
It is by now well documented in empirical research at various levels of aggre-
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gation (firms, industries, and aggregate bilateral activity) that the location
of MNE activity across countries inter alia depends on national profit tax
policy (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2006,
2008; Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Grubert and Mutti, 2004; Huizinga and
Nicodème, 2006; Egger, Pfaffermayr, Loretz, and Winner, 2009; Overesch
and Wamser, 2009). However, two concerns may be raised with such work.
First, for some countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, or the United States,
the (unique) profit tax rate is an artifact, since tax authorities at the sub-
national level may determine taxes on profits in their jurisdiction. Second,
host countries differ in many ways rather than only in profit taxes, most im-
portantly with regard to institutional characteristics that are hard to mea-
sure. Omission of relevant institutional determinants of MNE activity is
likely in cross-country studies and may bias empirical estimates of the sen-
sitivity of MNE activity with respect to taxation and other variables. Both
problems can be avoided when considering firm location decisions at the
sub-national level. Of course, a prerequisite for this is the existence of sub-
national jurisdictions with tax authority and some heterogeneity in the profit
tax rates.
There is a small literature on the nexus between firm births (national and
foreign firms) and taxation which focuses on location decisions across regions
within a country. For instance, Slemrod (1990; analyzing direct investments
in 50 U.S. states by parent country), Papke (1991; exploiting information
across 22 U.S. states), Hines (1996; analyzing foreign direct investment in
50 U.S. states by home country), List (2001; using 58 Californian counties),
Swenson (2001; considering investment decisions across U.S. states by dis-
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tinguishing investment types and industries of investment), and Brühlhart,
Jametti, and Schmidheiny (2007; focusing on 213 large Swiss municipalities)
belong here. Of these studies, only Slemrod (1990), Hines (1996), List (2001),
and Swenson (2001) focus on the location decisions of foreign firms (i.e., for-
eign MNEs) explicitly and, hence, ask questions which are comparable to
ours. List (2001) analyzes the impact of the per-capita property tax rate on
MNEs rather than a profit tax burden which is directly levied on businesses.
Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) are interested not only in the impact of
state-level corporate tax rates in the U.S. but also in the role of the system
of double taxation relief in the recipient countries. Swenson (2001) primarily
focuses on the different responsiveness of alternative types of investments
in the United States.1 Apart from the differences in the research questions
posed in this paper as compared to the ones just mentioned, the number
of subnational jurisdictions (i.e., the number of host locations) available is
larger than in previous work by more than one order of magnitude.
We compile a large panel data-set on local business tax rates and other data
at the municipality level. In Germany, municipalities may independently set
a so-called Gewerbesteuer (or business tax rate). This business tax rate is
levied on profits of companies and represents the most important source of
revenues accruing to policy instruments which are at a municipality’s discre-
tion. Our data-set covers more than 11, 000 German municipalities over the
period 2001 to 2005. We link it with data on the location of foreign MNEs
in Germany from Deutsche Bundesbank’s Micro-Database Direct Investment
1Already Auerbach and Hassett (1993) suggested that alternative forms of investment
should respond differently to tax policy.
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(MiDi).2 The set of locations (municipalities) considered here is much more
homogeneous than in cross-country data. For instance, in contrast to an
international setting, other tax parameters such as taxes on income are iden-
tical across German municipalities since they are levied at the national level.
The variability of the effective profit tax rate across municipalities is brought
about by the variability in business tax rates alone while other determinants
of the tax base (such as the method of double taxation relief, withholding
tax rates, depreciation allowances, etc.) are homogeneous across municipali-
ties. Moreover, sub-national data allow one to control for the heterogeneity
of locations within countries, which is more difficult with national data.
Attracting foreign-owned firms to a municipality promises jobs and local
business tax income. There is anecdotal evidence of municipalities which
lower their tax rates so as to explicitly attract foreign firms. One well-known
example is the small town of Holzkirchen, close to Munich in Upper Bavaria,
that lowered its business tax rate to appeal to Sandoz, a big pharmaceuti-
cal firm.3 Another example constitutes the municipality of Amering which
2The work of Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) blends home country and host juris-
diction issues with corporate taxation. Unlike them, we do not distinguish foreign MNEs
according to their country of origin. We focus on the responsiveness of MNE location
(from anywhere) to host jurisdiction business tax rates for two reasons. First, we are
interested in how a given number of foreign investments to just one country (Germany)
is allocated within the country in response to tax rates. Hence, we disregard multilateral
considerations of investors – e.g., decisions related to whether to invest in Germany at all.
Second, the huge number of host jurisdictions involves a relatively large fraction of munic-
ipalities where no investment is undertaken at all. The fraction of zeros would necessarily
rise more than proportionately if we distinguished investors by their country of origin. We
discuss this issue further in section 6.3.
3See http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/10/51958/ reporting that
Holzkirchen had lowered its local business tax rate by 30 percent, making it the
second-lowest in the state of Bavaria, in its (successful) attempt to attract Sandoz.
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managed to lure Kathrein, the world leader in satellite dishes, to locate its
headquarters there, by lowering its local business tax rate.4
Although these examples illustrate that some municipalities consider the at-
traction of foreign MNEs of prime interest, it is not only the number of MNEs
that matters, but the real activity they develop. We therefore also consider
two further measures of MNE activity: MNE employment and MNE real
assets.
Econometrically, we have to deal with the fact that the majority of munic-
ipalities in Germany does not attract any foreign MNEs. Moreover, many
of the municipalities which successfully attract foreign MNEs host only a
small number of them. We use count data models (when looking at the
number of foreign MNEs) as well as linear and non-linear estimation models
(for all outcomes), to estimate the impact of business taxation on the foreign
MNE activity in a municipality, controlling for other determinants such as
population characteristics, the skill level of the work force, and geographical
characteristics. We estimate both cross-section and panel data models, where
business tax rates are treated as endogenous and instrumented by character-
istics of neighboring municipalities. Across the board, we identify a negative
impact of business tax rates on the number of MNEs in a municipality which
is significantly different from zero.
For all three measures of MNE activity, we find that lower (simple or formula-
apportioned) business tax rates attract MNEs, conditional on other deter-
4See http://www.kathrein.de/de/presse/cont/texte2005/pi0553.htm.
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minants of MNE activity. We discuss the magnitude of the effects and find
them to be of reasonable size. For instance, in cross-section IV regressions,
a one-percent reduction of the municipal business tax rate (equivalent to a
decline by about 0.14 percentage points) leads to an increase in the number
of foreign MNEs there by about 0.45. The average municipality would have
to reduce its business tax rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from
its average level to attract one foreign MNE. Hence, municipalities need to
be attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract
firms at the margin.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
most important institutional details of the German municipal business tax.
We summarize the literature on determinants of MNE location in section
1.3. Section 1.4 describes features of the data-set. Section 1.5 introduces
the empirical strategy for the analysis of the impact of business taxes on
the number of MNEs locating in a municipality. Section 1.6 summarizes the
empirical findings from both cross-section and panel data analyses. The last
section provides some concluding remarks.
1.2 The German municipal business tax
German municipalities have autonomy in determining the local business tax
rate (Gewerbesteuer), levied on profits of companies.5 The local business
5For exceptions, see §3 of the German business tax law.
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tax rate is one of the most important policy instruments at a municipality’s
discretion, because it represents their main source of revenue. The tax base
is defined by the federal tax law which applies uniformly in all municipali-
ties. What municipalities may actually choose is the so-called Hebesatz (or
multiplier) which is a factor that is measured in percent and applied on the
constant Steuermesszahl (or base) of 5 percent for corporate entities in all
municipalities.6 The tax rate on corporate profits in municipality i with a
multiplier Hi is determined as ti = Hi × 0.05/[(100 + (Hi × 0.05)].7 For
instance, a multiplier of 200 means that the business tax rate determined by
the municipality amounts to 9 percent. To avoid detrimental effects of tax
competition, the federal Gewerbesteuergesetz GewStG (business tax law; §16
Abs. 4 S. 2 GewStG.) determined a floor of 200 percent for the multiplier
from 2004 onwards. Hence, municipalities may only choose a multiplier of
200 or higher. If they do not specify a multiplier, a value of 200 percent (i.e.,
a business tax rate of 9 percent) is set by default. Before 2004, municipalities
were free to set a business tax rate of less than 9 percent, but only a very
small fraction of municipalities did so. Tax exemptions to attract firms are
illegal (see Glanegger and Güroff, 1999, p. 929).
To some extent, profit-shifting between plants in an attempt to escape the
local business tax is limited by formula apportionment: firm profits to be
taxed are apportioned to each municipality according to the share of payroll
6In 2008 the Steuermesszahl for corporate entities was changed to 3.5 percent for all
municipalities.
7The tax payments are deductible from the tax base.
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paid there.8 By German tax law, all profits associated with a legally inde-
pendent (domestically- or foreign-owned) firm in Germany are attributed to
the controlled entities within Germany according to the respective wage bill
shares. Suppose a firm f is located in municipality A and has two branches,
one in municipality B and one in C. Total profits in those locations are
¼f = ¼fA + ¼fB + ¼fC and the total wage bill is wf = wfA + wfB + wfC .
With tax rate ti in municipality i ∈ {A,B,C}, profit tax revenue in i is then
ti(wfi/wf )¼f .
As mentioned in the introduction, other tax parameters such as taxes on
income are levied at the national level and thus identical across German
municipalities. The variability of the effective profit tax rate across munici-
palities is brought about by the variability in business tax rates alone while
other determinants of the tax base such as depreciation allowances, or in the
specific case of foreign-owned firms the method of double taxation relief or
withholding tax rates, are homogeneous across municipalities.
1.3 Determinants of MNE activity abroad
In our empirical analysis, we estimate parsimonious models of the number of
foreign MNEs locating in German municipalities. As suggested by previous
research on the impact of profit (or capital) taxation on lumpy investment
8However, formula apportionment can be avoided by a strategic choice of the organi-
zation structure of firms and location decisions about their incorporation.
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decisions by MNEs, we expect higher business tax rates levied by municipali-
ties to exert a negative impact on the number of foreign MNEs locating there.
To the extent that foreign MNE location entails real activity, we expect the
same to hold for MNE employment and real assets. However, to isolate the
role of business taxes on MNEs’ location decisions, we have to control for
other key explanatory variables suggested by the literature. These are the
following.
According to a sizable body of work in theoretical international economics,
knowledge-capital embodied in skilled workers is one of the key determinants
of MNE activity (see Markusen, 2002). In accordance with that line of rea-
soning, empirical research identified a key role of the local supply of skilled
labor to play for the location MNEs (see Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001;
Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003). While
previous evidence is available for investment (and foreign affiliate sales) at
the national level, similar arguments ought to hold for the location within
a country. Our skill measure is the share of workers with tertiary school
education per municipality.
A second key factor determining MNE activity according to previous re-
search is host country location size (see Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti
and Venables, 2004). Using country (or country-pair) data in previous em-
pirical work, host market size is typically controlled for by variables based
on gross domestic product (GDP). However, GDP is not available (as well
as endogenous) at regionally very disaggregated levels. For this reason, we
include population density, the independency ratio of the population (i.e.,
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the number of people aged between 15 and 65 years as a fraction of total
population in the region) and geographical area.9 Notice that – once in-
cluding log geographical area as well – we may interpret the coefficient of
log population density as reflecting the elasticity with respect to population
size. The independency ratio is the best measure available to capture the
relative size of the working-age population in a region. Including log area
along with population density also provides a measure of the relative abun-
dance of land as such, which may be used relatively intensively in some of
the sectors MNEs operate in.10,11
Research at the aggregate level has further pointed to the role of physical
capital for MNEs’ plant set-up (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). Since
data on capital stocks are not available at the regional level, the best we
can do to proxy for capital is to include the log gross investment share (in
total expenditures) of a municipality. In line with previous theoretical work,
we expect that larger gross investments – reflecting bigger local stocks of
9One might think of distance to a metropolitan area as a further possible determinant.
However, this is highly correlated with geographical area and population in the cross-
section, and it is wiped out by the method applied with panel data. Therefore, we do not
include this variable.
10There are various ways of specifying these influences. For instance, including log pop-
ulation and log area obtains identical results to those where we use population density
and log area. This has to do with the chosen functional form of the regression models.
Similarly, using the area covered with buildings and streets (instead of log total geograph-
ical area) along with the log share of area reserved for building obtains similar results.
However, the models we propose later on are less prone to multi-collinearity than the latter
one.
11Another strand of research includes market potential – i.e., some inverse-trade-cost-
weighted average of market size of other regions as a determinant of firm location (see
Head and Mayer, 2004). However, due to the lack of data on municipality-level GDP, we
may not employ such a measure here.
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capital in equilibrium – positively affect the inclination of foreign MNEs to
locate in a German municipality. For similar reasons, we include the fraction
of land area covered with infrastructure (buildings and streets). We also
include the log land price per square meter in Euro to proxy for the quality
of infrastructure.
Finally, we may be concerned about structural differences between Western
and Eastern German municipalities in their ability to attract foreign MNEs.
To capture the latter, we include an indicator variable which takes a value
of zero for municipalities in the former Western Germany and a value of one
for municipalities in the New Länder.12 Since the available infrastructure in
Germany’s New Länder was and still is of a lower quality, on average, than
in the Old Länder in the sample period, we expect the parameter of this
variable to take a negative sign.
1.4 Data
The data on MNE activity come from Deutsche Bundesbank’sMicro-Database
Direct Investment (MiDi). All German firms with a balance sheet total of
more than 3 million Euro in which foreign investors hold 10% or more of the
12Overall, Germany consists of 16 Länder. Of those, the following 11 are located in the
former Western German part of the country (the Old Länder): Baden-Württemberg, Bay-
ern, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-
Pfalz, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein. The following 5 Länder are located in the for-
mer Eastern German part of the country (the New Länder): Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Thüringen.
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shares or voting rights are required by law to report to Deutsche Bundes-
bank balance sheet information as well as information on the sector, legal
form, and number of employees.13 Indirect participating interests are to be
reported whenever nonresidents hold more than 50% in a domestic firm and
these dependent enterprises themselves hold 10% or more of the shares or
voting rights in other domestic enterprises. An appealing feature of this
data-set is that it comprises the universe of inward FDI (above the reporting
threshold) undertaken in Germany. For each foreign-owned, legally indepen-
dent firm, we know its location (municipality) in Germany. The number of
MNEs located in a municipality is our first measure of MNE activity. Two
additional measures capture the size of the firms’ operations in terms of their
employment and fixed assets. Note that employment and fixed assets are re-
ported as part of the Germany-wide balance sheet of legally independent
foreign-owned firms and thus refer to their activity not only at the main
location, but possibly also at further (legally dependent) locations across
Germany (if there are any).14
13The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
For details and a documentation on the micro-level data set MiDi see Lipponer (2008).
14Each legally independent firm that is owned abroad is associated with one address in
MiDi. The address in Germany notified to Deutsche Bundesbank either refers to a unit of
a foreign MNE with only a single plant in Germany or one with other legally dependent
locations in case of a multi-plant structure in Germany. If a foreign investor owns several
legally independent affiliates in Germany, we observe the location of each one. To give an
example, if the Austrian controlled Egger Inc. with headquarters in Munich owns 100% in
Merlo Ltd. and Merlo Ltd. is a legal entity of its own, Merlo Ltd. also needs to report. In
contrast, legally dependent branches of a foreign-owned firm report no separate balance
sheet information. Note that different affiliates and branches can be located within the
same town (for instance, Siemens has many different units in Munich), in which case the
same tax rate applies.
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The fact that MNE employment and fixed assets cannot be fully attributed
to the location of the legally independent unit poses a challenge with regard
to multi-location firms. Unfortunately, the MiDi data do not reveal which
MNEs are single-location firms and which are multi-location firms, so we
cannot run separate regressions for the two groups of firms.
We therefore have to address the issue of multi-location firms differently. To
do so, we draw additional information from the Monthly Survey of Plants
in Manufacturing and Mining (own translation of Monatsbericht für Betriebe
im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe sowie Bergbau und Gewinnung von Steinen und
Erden) in Germany that is held at the German Federal Statistical Office
in Wiesbaden. This survey covers both national firms as well as MNEs in
MiDi.15 At the descriptive level, this survey reveals that the vast majority of
manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees in Germany (more than
three quarters of all firms) are single-plant firms. Only 16.4% of firms have
plants in two (or more) of the 16 German states. Admittedly, we cannot
exclude the possibility that MNEs are more likely to be multi-location firms
than the average firm.16 Multi-location firms are of interest for a second
reason: the German tax law stipulates formula apportionment: firm profits
to be taxed are apportioned to each municipality according to the share of
payroll paid there.17
15German law does not allow us to merge, at the firm level, the survey data with the MiDi
data. Hence, we can only draw information on “representative firms” per municipality.
16However, we know from German MNEs’ outbound activity that the median German
MNE hosts a single foreign affiliate per country in every year since 1996, and 80.6% of the
firms run only a single foreign affiliate per country. Hence, we conjecture that a similar
pattern prevails for inbound MNE activity.
17See the German business tax law, in particular, §29 GewStG (Gewerbesteuergesetz).
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We address the issue of multi-location firms and formula apportionment by
computing a municipality-specific formula-apportioned tax rate (FATAX) of
the representative multi-location firm in each municipality. We define the
latter as the average business tax rate paid by a representative firm located
in municipality i which takes account of the structure and distribution of
production activities across municipalities in Germany. To obtain the FA-
TAX of municipality i in year t on the basis of the Monthly Survey of Plants
in Manufacturing and Mining in Germany, we proceeded as follows. First,
we identified all firms with a production plant in municipality i and year t.
Second, we identified the set Jit of all municipalities which hosted firms with
one or more plants in municipality i at time t. Let us use acronym wfijt ≥ 0
with the following definition: wfijt = 0 for any firm which does not have a
production site in i at time t and wfijt ≥ 0 is firm f ’s wage bill in j otherwise.
All firms with a production site in i have a wage bill wfiit > 0 there. All
firms which have a plant in i and possibly elsewhere but not in j ∕= i have
wfijt = 0. Then, Bijt =
∑
f wfijt is the total wage bill of all i-based firms
across municipalities j in year t. It may be viewed as the ij-th entry of an
N ×N matrix Bt for year t, where N is the number of municipalities. Define
Wijt = Bijt(
∑
j
∑
f wfijt)
−1 as the ij-th element of the N×N matrix Wt and
note that Wt may be viewed as a row-sum-normalized counterpart to Bt. All
elements in a row sum up to unity and, hence, the entries across columns in
a row of Wt reflect shares of the wage bill of all firms with plants in i across
municipalities j in year t. If there were only single-plant firms in Germany,
both Bt and Wt would be diagonal matrices. More specifically, Wt would
then be an identity matrix of size N . In the data, these matrices do have
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positive off-diagonal elements and neither of them is symmetric. We use Wt
to premultiply the N × 1 vector of original business tax rates across munic-
ipalities, TAXt, to generate the N × 1 vector FATAXt = WtTAXt whose
typical element is FATAXit. FATAXt is a vector of weighted tax rates
consistent with formula apportionment for the representative firm in i and
year t. We will generally provide results based on TAX and, alternatively,
FATAX.
Data on variables capturing other determinants of MNE location are drawn
from several further sources. Municipality-level data on the qualification of
employees were compiled on special request based on the universe of German
social-security records of the German Federal Labor Agency (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit). The observations are the universe of workers registered for un-
employment insurance, representing around 80% of the German workforce.18
Our skill measure is the share of workers with tertiary school education in
municipality i and year t.
Municipality-level data on business tax rates, population, geographical area,
the independency ratio, the fraction of land area covered with buildings and
streets (a measure of available infrastructure), and gross investments are pro-
vided by different federal statistical offices of the 16 German states (Länder)
in the database Statistik Lokal distributed by the German Statistical Office
(Statistisches Bundesamt).
18Coverage includes full- and part-time workers of private enterprises, apprentices, and
other trainees, as well as temporarily suspended employment relationships. Civil servants,
student workers, and self-employed individuals are excluded and make up the remaining
20% of the formal-sector labor force.
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As mentioned before, there are two advantages of looking at location choices
at the sub-national level. One is that firms face a much more homogeneous
institutional setting across municipalities within a country than at the inter-
national level. Another advantage of using sub-national data is that one may
account more accurately for the heterogeneity of locations. Cross-country
data use national averages that might suffer from aggregation bias.19 By
looking at the smallest regional unit (municipalities), aggregation bias is
ruled out.
In Germany, there are over 12, 000 municipalities. For 11, 200 of those, we
have a panel data-set of the dependent and explanatory variables over the
period 2001 to 2005 with at least two consecutive observations in the sample
period.20 Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the whole panel data-
set covering annual data over 2001-2005. Altogether, one obtains 39, 124
observations after eliminating ones where explanatory variables are missing.
As indicated before, for each of the covered 11, 200 municipalities at least
two consecutive years are available. Across all years, only 6, 073 observations
– or somewhat less than 16% – pertained to municipality-year dyads with
a positive number of foreign MNEs (i.e, where yit > 0 independent of the
outcome considered).
19Consider two countries A and B with identical national averages. For instance, country
A might have a skilled labor force but a bad infrastructure in one half of the country
and a good infrastructure but unskilled labor in the other half of the country. Country
B, in contrast, might have both skilled labor and a good infrastructure in one half of the
country and neither skilled labor nor a good infrastructure in the other half of the country.
These sub-national differences might matter for aggregate outcomes, but are washed out
in national aggregates.
20The difference between the total number of more than 12,000 municipalities and the
smaller one in the panel data-set accrues to lacking data on some of the explanatory
variables for municipalities in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (except for the six
Kreisfreie Städte – i.e., larger cities – in that state: Greifswald, Neubrandenburg, Rostock,
Schwerin, Stralsund, and Wismar).
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Figure 1.1 shows a histogram of the number of legally independent foreign-
owned firms across all municipalities in 2005. Whereas 86% of the municipal-
ities did not host a single foreign MNE, six municipalities (Hamburg, Munich,
Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Berlin, and Cologne) hosted more than 200 each in
that year. Altogether, the latter six municipalities hosted almost one-third
of all foreign-owned firms in Germany in that year. Figure 1.2 illustrates the
geographical distribution of foreign MNEs using a map of Germany.21
21For reasons of confidentiality and as mentioned in the notes to Figure 1.2, we may
only display data for municipalities with three or more MNEs. For that reason we decided
against a representation of data on employment or fixed assets in terms of a map.
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Figure 1.1: Histogram of number of foreign affiliates in a municipality
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Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). See main text for
details.
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Figure 1.2: Geographical distribution of foreign affiliates
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Note: For reasons of confidentiality, we may only display data for municipalities with
three or more headquarters. Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase Direct
Investment (MiDi). See main text for details.
For the same cross section of our panel data-set in 2005, we may visualize the
simple correlation between the presence of foreign MNEs, employment, and
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fixed assets with the business tax rate in German municipalities unconditional
on other determinants of location by means of simple scatter plots.
In Figure 1.3 a, c, and e we consider the relationship for all municipalities,
including ones with no foreign MNEs (yit = 0). In Figure 1.3 b, d, and f we
illustrate it only for municipalities with a positive number of foreign MNEs
(yit > 0). Irrespective of which of the figures we look at, the unconditional
relationship between business tax rates and outcome looks to be weakly pos-
itive, if anything. Do municipalities with higher business tax rates attract a
larger number of foreign-owned firms? This sounds counter-intuitive. How-
ever, conditional on other factors – such as the availability of skilled workers,
region size, a relatively large fraction of population in working-age, etc. –
high business tax rates may well be harmful for MNE location, irrespective
of the unconditional relationship in Figure 1.3. We may refer to the source
of the positive relationship between the number of foreign-owned firms and
the local business tax rate in Figure 1.3 as one of endogeneity of business tax
rates – i.e., their correlation with observable or unobservable determinants
of the number of foreign-owned firms, as well as their employees, and their
assets held per municipality. To reduce or avoid this endogeneity bias, we
now turn to various forms of multivariate regression analysis.
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Figure 1.3: Scatter plots
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1.5 Econometric issues
Regarding the econometric analysis of the dependent variables of interest,
two issues of the data are particularly relevant. First, there is a large num-
ber of zeros across municipalities in every given year. Hence, a randomly
drawn municipality has a low chance (14 percent) of attracting one or more
foreign-owned firms. Second, municipalities may set their taxes specifically
to attract foreign firms. The former requires estimation of models which can
deal with disproportionate amounts of zeros in the data and the latter call for
an approach which avoids or at least reduces the endogeneity bias of business
tax rates on the outcome.
We address these problems in a number of ways. First, we estimate cross
section models for count data using the last available year of data, 2005.
Second, we estimate fixed effects panel data models which exploit the time
variation in the outcome variables within each municipality. In both cases we
allow for endogenous municipal taxes, which are instrumented by weighted
averages (within a certain distance radius) of characteristics of the neighbor-
ing municipalities.22 Empirical tax competition models unequivocally model
tax rates in some unit i as a weighted function of tax rates in non-i units.
Such models may be referred to as spatial econometric frameworks, where ob-
servations are cross-sectionally dependent. The corresponding reduced form
of tax rates can then be portrayed as a nonlinear weighted function, where
22A detailed description of the instruments used in each regression is found in sections
1.6.1 and 1.6.2
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i’s tax rate depends on characteristics of i as well as of weighted character-
istics of non-i units (see Kelejian and Prucha, 1999; Kelejian, Prucha, and
Yuzefovich, 2004).
1.5.1 Cross section models for count data
The number of foreign-owned firms is in fact a count variable. The most
frequently applied count data model is the Poisson regression model.23 It is
obtained by assuming that each realization of the count dependent variable
yi for cross-sectional observation i is drawn from a Poisson distribution with
parameter ¸(xi; ¯) = exp(xi¯), where xi is a 1 × K vector of explanatory
variables (which includes TAXit or, alternatively, FATAXit) and ¯ the cor-
responding K×1 vector of regression parameters. The conditional mean and
variance are simultaneously determined by the parameter ¸(xi; ¯):
E(yi∣xi) = V ar(yi∣xi) = exp(xi¯).
This last feature of the Poisson distribution (referred to as equi-dispersion, or
equality of mean and variance) renders the Poisson regression model often too
restrictive in applications. In particular, the model tends to under-predict the
frequency of zeros and of large counts for data in which the actual variance is
larger than the mean (referred to as over-dispersion). In our application, we
have both a large number of zeros and a few very large counts so that over-
23For a thorough discussion of the count data models described in this section, see
Winkelmann (2003) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
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dispersion is likely a problem. A possibly suitable model in this case is the
negative binomial model (NB). This model is obtained by setting ¸i = ¹iºi,
where ¹i = exp(xi¯) and ºi > 0 is a gamma-distributed disturbance term
with E(ºi) = 1 and V ar(ºi) = ®. The conditional mean and variance of the
NB model are24
E(yi∣xi) = ¹i V ar(yi∣xi) = ¹i(1 + ®¹i)
thus allowing for over-dispersion and providing a good fit to many types of
data.
For data like ours, with 86% of zero observations in 2005, a zero-inflated
(ZI) model – which assumes an extra proportion of zeros additionally to the
zero observations arising from the count data distribution – should fit the
data even better. Zeros are allowed to occur as an outcome of two different
regimes. In one regime the outcome will always be zero and in the other
one the standard count process is at work resulting in either zero or positive
values.25
24The model with this particular parametrization is known as NB type-II model (see
Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
25The model combines a binary variable describing the probability of extra zeros with
a standard count variable. The probability function is given by
f(yi) =
{
!i + (1− !i)g(yi = 0) if y = 0 ,
(1− !i)g(yi ∣ yi > 0) if y ≥ 1,
where, for instance, !i can be a logit and g(yi) a NB density. In our application, the binary
process reflects the economic suitability of a municipality for hosting a foreign MNE at
all, and the conditional mean of the count process describes the number of foreign-owned
firms that are actually attracted given a municipality’s general suitability for foreign MNE
location.
Chapter 1 – How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity 28
Such models (including Poisson, NB, and ZI versions thereof) can be esti-
mated by the maximum likelihood method. Both the NB model and the
ZI-NB model assume that business tax rates are exogenous. If the average
municipality altered business tax rates to attract foreign MNEs, assuming
exogeneity could be hardly tenable.26 Mullahy (1997) derives moment con-
ditions for generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of count data
models with endogenous regressors and valid instruments. We use Mullahy’s
approach with cross-sectional data under the assumption of endogenous tax
rates.
1.5.2 Fixed effects panel data models
Eventually, one might doubt the possibility to circumvent the endogeneity
problem in a cross section at all. In particular, one could push things further
and assume that any information contained in the stock of legally indepen-
dent foreign-owned firms hosted in a municipality could lead to endogeneity.
Focusing on new headquarters could help reducing the endogeneity bias in
tax rates significantly. For this, we resort to fixed effects panel data analysis.
The corresponding models for municipality i in year t about outcome yit may
26Notice that this is more than to say that municipalities use business tax rates to
attract firms in general. In our application, the average municipality is not able to attract
any foreign MNEs. This may be seen as an indication that the attraction of such firms is
not the most important (or even an impossible) policy objective of the average German
municipality. Hence, we expect the endogeneity issue as subordinate, here. However, we
mention and apply suitable methods for completeness and as a robustness check to the
conventional count data models.
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be characterized as
yit = xit¯ + ¹i + uit (1.1)
where i is an index for municipalities, t = 1, ...T is an index for time with
T = 5 denoting the number of years our panel covers (2001-2005), xit is
a 1 × K vector of explanatory variables (one of them being TAXit or, al-
ternatively, FATAXit), ¯ is a corresponding K × 1 parameter vector, ¹i
is a fixed municipality-specific effect, and uit is a time-variant idiosyncratic
disturbance term.27
Fixed effects estimation of (1.1) identifies the parameter vector ¯ by exploit-
ing the time variation in yit. In general, the model in (1.1) will be based only
on municipalities for which yit ∕= yis at least for one tuple t, s. Furthermore,
fixed effects estimation of (1.1) is immune against correlation of the elements
in xit with ¹i + uit as long as this correlation involves only ¹i but not uit.
Hence, that model reduces problems of endogeneity of TAXit or FATAXit
by allowing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with
the tax variables.
While some of the panel data regressions involve the strictly nonnegative yit
as dependent variable, others will be based upon ln yit.
28 In the former case,
the number of covered observations will be much larger than in the latter
27In principal, fixed effects model estimation is possible with nonlinear models such as
Poisson, NB, or ZI versions thereof. However, it turns out that pooling cross-section and
time-series data in a short panel such as ours leads to convergence problems with maximum
likelihood estimation. Since we are mostly interested in conditional means, we therefore
employ linear models and truncated models with sample selection in this case.
28In our context the problem of a large mass of zeros in the data is greatly reduced for
estimation of ¯ in models involving ln yit instead of yit.
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case. The parameters are not directly comparable between models using
yit and those using ln yit. In the latter case, the parameters on TAXit and
FATAXit are semi-elasticities,
29 while in the former case they are not.30 In
any case, log-transformation of yit leads to a truncated sample about which
– given that the number of zeros in yit is relatively large – the assumption
of random selection of municipalities into positive numbers of foreign-owned
firms may be called into question.
Although the bias associated with either sample selection or endogeneity of
TAXit or FATAXit is mitigated to some extent by fixed effects estimation
of (1.1), it is unlikely fully removed. For this reason, for models with yit as
dependent variables, we estimate a fixed effects two-stage least squares model
assuming that TAXit or FATAXit is correlated with uit (see Baltagi, 2008).
When using a truncated sample in models which involve ln yit instead of yit,
we follow an established literature in econometrics that model participation
(the process of yit = 0 versus yit > 0) and outcome (the process of yit > 0)
by a bivariate model (see Wooldridge, 2002, or Cameron and Trivedi, 1998,
for an overview).31 Specifically, we follow the approach of Wooldridge (1995)
as adapted for endogenous regressors by Semykina and Wooldridge (2005)
to account for endogeneity of TAXit or FATAXit in the fixed effects model
(1.1) based on ln yit.
29Then, a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate induces a one-hundredth change
in ln yit.
30Then, a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate induces a one-hundredth change
in yit.
31An alternative to a selection model which rests on somewhat stronger assumptions
would be a two-part approach which models zero-versus-positive yit and positive yit as
two independent processes.
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1.6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we will analyze the determinants of the location of foreign-
owned firms across municipalities in Germany. We will primarily focus on
numbers of such firms per municipality as an outcome in cross section and
fixed effects panel data regressions. However, in an extension we will consider
other outcomes such as employment or fixed assets of foreign-owned firms.
1.6.1 Cross section models
We start by estimating models on the cross-sectional data-set and assume
that the matrix of explanatory variables includes – apart from TAX or
FATAX – the following variables: SKILL (the log share of employees with
a tertiary education), POPDEN (the log population density), AREA (the
log total area of the municipality in square kilometers), IDEPRAT (the log
independency ratio, defined as the population aged 15-64 divided by the to-
tal population), BUILT (the log fraction of area in a municipality which is
covered by buildings and streets), INV (the log share of investment expendi-
tures of the municipality in total expenditures), LPRICE (the log land price
per square meter in Euro), and EAST (a dummy for municipalities located
in the New Länder, i.e., in the former Eastern German part of the country).
While Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the covariates included in
the analysis across all years 2001-2005, the ones for the cross section of 2005
as used in this subsection are very similar.
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We generally use once-lagged values of the explanatory variables in the econo-
metric models. Hence, we employ values for 2004 on the right-hand side of
all cross-section models. This is to avoid any bias associated with contem-
poraneous shocks in the dependent and the explanatory variables. Since all
explanatory variables except for TAX or FATAX and EAST are in logs,
all but those variables’ parameters can be interpreted as elasticities. Table
1.3 summarizes the corresponding regression results.
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The numbers in Table 1.3 indicate that the over-dispersion parameter is
significantly different from zero. Hence, the negative binomial model is better
suited for the data and specification at hand than the Poisson model (see
Winkelmann, 2003; and Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). With the fairly large
fraction of zeros in the dependent variable, a separate modeling of the zero
threshold is recommended.
Regarding the covariates, we find that larger municipalities (AREA) with
a greater population density (POPDEN), a higher skill endowment ratio
(SKILL), and a larger fraction of infrastructure (BUILT ) are more suc-
cessful in attracting foreign MNEs. These effects are consistent with pre-
dictions from the theoretical literature on MNE location (Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Barba
Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Given everything else, German municipali-
ties in the Old Länder are more successful in attracting foreign MNEs than
municipalities in the New Länder (East). In contrast to our expectations,
land prices (LPRICE) and MNE activity are positively correlated. This
could be interpreted in two ways: LPRICE could reflect the quality of
infrastructure, which we do not have good controls for; or LPRICE is en-
dogenous to foreign MNE location. However, the latter is not quite likely,
since the average exposure of municipalities to foreign-owned firms is quite
low. Other covariates except tax rates do not display an important impact
on foreign MNE location.32
32One might add spatially lagged control variables to the models estimated. However,
this strategy leads to convergence problems in the nonlinear cross section models, arguably
due to multicollinearity with the tax rates (tax rates are a function of spatially lagged
exogenous variables in nonlinear tax competition models such as ours), and they would be
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Table 1.3: Cross section 2005
Zero-Inflated
Negative Binomial Negative Binomial IV Poisson
No. FO firms (S) No. FO firms (S) No. FO firms (S)
TAX -12.893*** - -6.825** - -59.738*** -
(2.407) (2.730) (22.273)
FATAX - -6.522** - -5.465* - -49.220***
(2.510) (3.253) (23.590)
SKILL 0.588*** 0.590*** 0.730*** 0.739*** 0.643*** 0.511***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.081) (0.081) (0.219) (0.164)
POPDEN 0.879*** 0.816*** 0.269** 0.242* 0.693*** 0.597***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.122) (0.125) (0.239) (0.225)
AREA 1.190*** 1.154*** 0.792*** 0.761*** 1.507*** 1.517***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.049) (0.045) (0.131) (0.136)
IDEPRAT 1.192 1.199 1.128 1.030 -3.717 -3.468
(0.868) (0.886) (1.189) (1.191) (2.865) (2.726)
BUILT 0.959*** 1.003*** 1.060*** 1.076*** 1.849*** 2.024***
(0.169) (0.170) (0.178) (0.180) (0.304) (0.294)
INV 0.324 0.049 -0.042 -0.040 -0.040 -0.006
(0.045) (0.045) (0.054) (0.054) (0.147) (0.141)
LPRICE 0.298*** 0.320*** 0.314*** 0.319*** 0.240 0.396**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.192) (0.154)
EAST -0.500*** -0.465*** -0.968*** -0.952*** 0.384 0.513
(0.126) (0.128) (0.133) (0.134) (0.431) (0.408)
constant -6.384*** -6.927*** -2.488*** -2.399*** -1.929 -3.914
(0.730) (0.738) (0.766) (0.797) (3.353) (3.355)
Wald 4,712.880 4,566.290 1,601.590 1,663.300
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood -5,379.003 -5,437.092 -5,255.841 -5,259.002
Observations 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048 11,048
Nonzero obs. 1,559 1,559 1,559 1,559 1,559 1,559
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates of the respective regression models. Robust standard er-
rors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
All explanatory variables are lagged once. In columns 5 and 6, TAX and FATAX instrumented.
The instruments used are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and streets,
the share of agricultural area, and the total area (all in logs) for (i) all municipalities within a
radius of 0 and 25 kilometers from the center of a given municipality and for (ii) all municipalities
within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a given municipality. The lower part of the
table reports the Wald (Â2) test statistic for joint significance of the regressors and its p-value,
the pseudo log-likelihood, the number of observations, and the number of groups (municipalities).
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In all models of Table 1.3, TAX and FATAX exert a negative impact on the
outcome. Hence, controlling for the suggested determinants of foreign MNE
location eliminates a large part of the bias in the unconditional relationships
portrayed in Figures 1.3. In Table 1.3, the estimated parameter of inter-
est is unambiguously statistically significantly different from zero at least at
10% conventional levels. In the zero-inflated negative binomial model, the
parameter estimates on TAX and FATAX are lower than in the simple neg-
ative binomial models. However, this should be interpreted with care, since
now extra weight is given to zero outcomes relative to the simple negative
binomial models. However, the parameters on TAX and FATAX differ in
both the negative binomial and the corresponding IV Poisson models.33 In
every one of the estimated models in Table 1.3 is the parameter on FATAX
lower than its counterpart on TAX. This could be consistent with a lower
inclination of foreign-owned firms to have a multi-plant organization across
municipalities in Germany than this is the case for average German firms.
Among the cross section models, we consider the IV Poisson model to be the
preferred approach, since it addresses the potential endogeneity of business
tax rates.34 With univariate models assuming an exogeneity of tax rates,
insignificant in the fixed effects panel data models.
33The identifying instruments behind the reduced-form models used for TAX and
FATAX are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and streets, the
share of agricultural area, and the total area (all in logs) for (i) all municipalities within a
radius of 0 and 25 kilometers from the center of a given municipality and for (ii) all mu-
nicipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a given municipality. They
are individually and jointly significant at the one percent level in all first-stage models.
This is not surprising, since what we estimate there is a reduced-form version of a tax
competition model which is known to work well at the national and sub-national level.
34We are not aware of IV versions of the NB and ZI-NB models, hence we only present
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one might expect that the estimated responsiveness of outcomes to tax rates
overestimates the true causal impact. For instance, this would be the case, if
municipalities competed over MNEs via low tax rates, and MNEs successfully
lobbied for low tax rates in a municipality which they would have picked
anyway for reasons other than local taxes. However, the direction of the
endogeneity bias is generally unclear in a multivariate setting as ours. With
the data and specifications at hand, the point estimates suggest that the
tax responsiveness is biased towards some positive value in models assuming
exogeneity of tax rates in Table 1.3.
How big is the impact of business tax rates on outcomes? For this, consider a
one-percentage-point change in TAX of the negative binomial model. Such
a change induces an outcome response by about 12%. The unconditional
mean of the number of affiliates is 0.772. Of that, 12% is about 0.09. Hence,
the average municipality would have to reduce its tax rate by about 11 (of an
average level of 14) percentage points to attract a single foreign-owned firm.
The IV Poisson model suggests that MNEs are somewhat more responsive
than that. There, a one-percentage-point reduction in TAX raises the stock
of MNEs by about 60 percent, i.e., by 0.45 legally independent foreign-owned
firms. Hence, the average municipality would have to reduce its business tax
rate by about 2.2 percentage points (or 15%) from its average level.35 From
IV Poisson models.
35Notice that such a municipality would (so far) earn all of its business tax revenues
from domestic firms. Hence, it would have to forego 15% of its tax revenues from such
firms in exchange for additional tax revenues of a single foreign-owned unit. Later on,
we will provide estimates suggesting that a 2.2 percentage-point reduction in the business
tax rate would raise employment in foreign-owned firms by less than 157. Hence, the tax
revenue loss from domestic firms would unlikely balance the tax revenue gains from the one
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that perspective, it seems remarkably difficult for the average municipality
to attract foreign firms. However, this is consistent with the fact that most
municipalities indeed do not attract foreign MNEs at all.
1.6.2 Fixed effects panel models
We start by estimating linear models on the panel data-set involving out-
comes in levels, yit, as well as sample selection models as proposed by Se-
mykina and Wooldridge (2005) involving ln yit as the dependent variable.
The former avoids dropping zero values of the outcome while the latter con-
trols for selection and truncation. With yit as the dependent variable, the
parameters of log-transformed variables represent the impact of a unitary
log-change on the level of the outcome. With ln yit such parameters repre-
sent elasticities.36 We are primarily interested in the impact of business tax
rates (TAX or FATAX) on outcomes. These tax rates are measured as
ratios. Hence, a one-percentage point increase in TAX or FATAX leads to
a response of yit by one-hundredth of the parameter value and to one of ln yit
by one percent (a semi-elasticity). Table 1.4 summarizes the results for the
two linear and the sample selection panel data models using the numbers of
foreign-owned firms per municipality in yit and ln yit.
new foreign-owned firm, even when assuming that there is no substitution in employment
between foreign-owned and domestic firms.
36Since inverse Mills ratios are not significantly different from zero, we may refrain
from discussing issues with the nonlinearity of selection models and the corresponding
nonlinearity of marginal effects. Rather, we may interpret the parameter in the outcome
equation as to directly reflect the impact of TAX or FATAX on the conditional mean of
the outcome of interest.
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Table 1.4: Panel 2001-2005
Fixed-effects IV Sample selection IV
No. FO firms (N) ln(No. FO firms (N))
TAX -19.490* - -227.784*** -
(11.016) (83.183)
FATAX - -21.591 - -62.021**
(13.172) (24.605)
SKILL -3.5e-04 4.1e-04 0.590** 0.149
(0.018) (0.018) (0.306) (0.200)
POPDEN -0.027 -0.042 -3.239 -1.863
(0.145) (0.146) (2.267) (1.366)
IDEPRAT -0.032 -0.022 -10.961* -7.534
(0.249) (0.250) (6.218) (5.096)
BUILT -0.024 -0.020 2.712** 0.837
(0.081) (0.082) (1.285) (1.026)
INV -1.6e-04 -1.3e-04 -0.088 -0.053
(0.005) (0.005) (0.104) (0.069)
LPRICE -0.006 -0.006 0.112 -0.034
(0.014) (0.014) (0.159) (0.096)
IMR -0.046 0.165
(0.566) (0.366)
Wald 860.880 848.390 84.620 139.910
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan-Hansen 5.841 6.141 0.946 2.069
p-value 0.119 0.105 0.814 0.558
Observations 39,124 39,124 941 941
Groups 11,200 11,200 680 680
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates of the respective regression models.
TAX and FATAX are instrumented. The instruments used are the averages
of the share of area covered with buildings and streets, the share of agricul-
tural area, the independency ratio, and the skilled labor share (all in logs) for
all municipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a given
municipality. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio from a pooled probit model for
the probability of the dependent variable being positive, results upon request.
The probit model includes the share of agricultural area of the municipality
as an instrument that affects selection. All regressions include time dummies.
Standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All explanatory variables are lagged once.
The lower part of the table reports the Wald (Â2) test statistic for joint signifi-
cance of the regressors and its p-value, the Sargan-Hansen statistic for the null
hypothesis of validity of the excluded instruments and its p-value, the number
of observations, and the number of groups (municipalities).
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All second-stage models involve – apart from TAX (the simple business tax
rate) or FATAX (the formula-apportioned business tax rate) – the following
explanatory variables: SKILL (the log share of employees with a tertiary
education), POPDEN (the log population density), AREA (the log total
area of the municipality in square kilometers), IDEPRAT (the log inde-
pendency ratio, defined as the population aged 15-64 divided by the total
population), BUILT (the log fraction of area in a municipality which is
covered by buildings and streets), INV (the log share of investment expen-
ditures of the municipality in total expenditures), and LPRICE (the land
price per square meter in Euro). Mean and standard deviation for these as
well as the outcome variables are provided in Table 1.2.
The regressors in these models display a high level of joint significance. The
identifying instruments behind the reduced-form models used for TAX and
FATAX37 are individually (except for the weighted share of buildings) and
jointly significant at less than one percent in any first-stage model. The
reported over-identification tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are valid.38
The numbers in Table 1.4 suggest the following results. First, recall that
the data underlying these models pertain to new locations of foreign-owned
37The instruments used are the averages of the share of area covered with buildings and
streets, the share of agricultural area, the independency ratio, and the skilled labor share
(all in logs) for all municipalities within a radius of 25 and 50 km from the center of a
given municipality. In the sample selection model we include the share of agricultural area
of the municipality in the selection equation.
38That is, that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and
correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
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firms and they wipe out all time-constant factors (e.g., that a municipality is
regularly able to attract such firms for measurable or unmeasurable reasons).
As a consequence, this renders most of the independent variables insignificant
for such location decisions from year to year across municipalities. However,
this radical strategy is capable of reducing the bias from endogeneity of TAX
and FATAX to a minimum. This is true for numbers of affiliates as well as
numbers of employees.
The covariates are not only insignificant because the between variation is
wiped out and they do not vary much over time. There is also some multi-
collinearity, since the covariates (after conditioning out the fixed effects) have
a jointly highly significant impact on outcome yit and ln yit. Interestingly,
the variation in TAX and FATAX is different enough from the other re-
gressors to exhibit a significant effect in all models. The reason for the latter
is that these variables do not change continuously and gradually as SKILL,
LPRICE or other regressors, which facilitates identification of their effect
on the outcome.
The panel data models do not suggest any qualitative change in the impact of
tax rates on location choice of foreign firms within Germany, relative to the
cross-section models. How does the quantitative impact of tax rates compare
with the cross-section results? For this, it is easiest to use the parameters
in the first column of Table 1.4, since the selection models are nonlinear in
nature and the inverse Mills ratio terms are insignificant (suggesting that
selection is not important). According to the first column of Table 1.4, if a
municipality wanted to attract one additional MNE, it would have to lower
Chapter 1 – How Low Business Tax Rates Attract MNE Activity 42
its tax rate by about 19.490−1 ≃ 5 percentage points or more than one-third
of the average level of TAX in the sample. This is about twice as much as
the effect estimated from the IV Poisson model in Table 1.3. However, the
cross-section IV Poisson results may be viewed as responses that pertain to
the long run where we could expect MNEs to display a greater response to
tax rates than from year to year.
1.6.3 Sensitivity and extensions
In this subsection, we summarize the effects from a variety of alternative
regressions. In particular, we use models for alternative types of MNEs (small
versus large units; firms which are held in countries with a tax credit system
versus all firms; non-holding and directly-held non-holding units instead of
all types of MNEs combined) as well as models with alternative outcomes. To
keep the discussion as short as possible, we only summarize the corresponding
coefficients on TAX and FATAX in Table 1.5.
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The upper panel of Table 1.5 pertains to cross section estimates so that
coefficients should be compared to the last pair of columns in Table 1.3,
while the lower panel of Table 1.5 refers to panel data estimates and should
be compared to the last two columns in Table 1.4. The six columns refer
to six types of sensitivity checks. The first four columns reflect parameter
estimates for sub-samples of different MNE types, namely units with below-
median employment in the sample, units which are held in countries applying
a tax credit system, non-holding units, and directly-held non-holding units.
As in the previous tables, the outcome variable in these columns is a count
of foreign MNEs of the specific type in a municipality.
The last two columns display tax parameter estimates for two alternative
outcomes, namely employment and fixed assets. Akin to the counts, we
use Poisson-type models for these outcomes in the cross section estimates
to avoid dropping zeros from the data. However, now these models are
pseudo-maximum-likelihood models. Again, we use selection models with
panel data, but the results are very similar to the ones of Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood models due to the lack of important correlation between
the latent process underlying the extensive municipality margin equation of
inward investment in Germany and the intensive margin model.
The figures in Table 1.5 suggest the following conclusions. First, the point es-
timates of the tax parameters are in almost all cases negative. The qualitative
insights from the models focusing on firms with below-median employment
are unchanged from the previous estimates.39 The results for firms which are
39Notice that the parameters should not be directly compared to the earlier estimates
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held in tax credit countries are much less clear-cut than those for all firms.
One reason for that is that there are only 16 economies which unilaterally
apply a tax credit system and hold firms in Germany. Hence, there is a
considerably smaller fraction of municipalities with a positive foreign-owned
firm count in comparison to the original estimates. Moreover, following Hines
(1996) we would expect that firms originating from such countries should be
less sensitive to foreign taxation than others.
The point estimates for the number of foreign-owned non-holding and directly-
held non-holding units in the cross section are not significantly different from
zero. Yet, the point estimates are somewhat smaller but also not significantly
different from the ones based on the sample of all firms in the last pair of
columns of Table 1.3. The main reason for their insignificance relates to
the drop in the number of observations with positive outcomes so that these
models are harder to estimate than the ones in Table 1.3. When consider-
ing panel data estimates in the lower panel of Table 1.5, we find, e.g., that
the parameter estimates for non-holding companies are quite similar to their
counterparts in the last two columns of Table 1.4. The point estimates differ
slightly more (but not statistically so) when using directly-held non-holding
units with panel data.
Similar to counts of firms, the point estimates for employment and fixed
assets for all types of MNEs are negative. However, only the one for employ-
ment when using TAX is estimated significantly different from zero in the
cross section. With panel data, the effects of business taxation on employ-
since the average number of such firms per municipality is much smaller than before.
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ment or fixed assets are better identifiable.
With the exception of the number of directly-held non-holding units as out-
come, the point estimates of FATAX are smaller in absolute value than the
ones of TAX. The latter may indicate that a municipality’s own tax may
be more important for the location decision even of multi-plant firms than
the one of other locations where units are based. This may be rationalized
as follows. First, we can expect foreign firms to typically enter the German
market with one unit and, eventually, to start forming a local tree of units
from that first location so that mainly the first location’s tax rate and less
so those of the branches are relevant for the location of legally independent
foreign-owned firms.40 Second, legally independent foreign-owned firms often
carry out important tasks and services not only for them but also for legally
dependent branches. Such tasks tend to involve high-skilled labor and sizable
wage bills so that the weight of independent units through formula apportion-
ment may be relatively high. Then, the business tax rate at the location of
an independent unit should be relatively important independent of whether
it is a stand-alone unit or it has independent subsidiaries attached to it.
One further extension would be to shed light on the variability of the esti-
mated tax (semi-)elasticities with observable determinants such as munici-
pality size, population density, or other determinants of MNE location. This
could be achieved by including interaction terms of business tax rates and
40MNEs tend to set up one affiliate at a time (see Egger, Fahn, Merlo, and Wamser,
2011). The unit by which firms explore a market upfront may likely develop the function
of a regional headquarter in the course of the development of a bigger foreign affiliate
network.
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other fundamentals. We have attempted to shed light on this matter by
involving municipality area and, alternatively, population density in inter-
action terms with TAX or FATAX. However, we encountered two problems
with this strategy. First, interaction terms between business tax rates and
other covariates are highly correlated with the main effects of the interacted
variables since the latter tend to vary more strongly than business tax rates
do (see Table 1.1). Second, interaction terms which involve an endogenous
variable (such as business tax rates) are endogenous as is the main effect of
TAX or FATAX. Hence, the number of endogenous variables which have to
be instrumented in a first stage increases. Both issues lead to a dramatic loss
of precision so that neither the parameter on the main effect of TAX or FA-
TAX nor the one on the interactive term can be estimated at conventionally
accepted significance levels.
1.6.4 Estimated tax effects in comparison to other work
Two fundamental differences between this paper and other work on profit
tax effects on MNE activity are the following. First, we focus on location
decisions or activity at the micro-regional level rather than the country or
macro-regional (such as state) level. Second, we mainly focus on the extensive
margin of activity in terms of numbers of firms that are held by foreign MNEs
rather than foreign direct investment.
By and large, the descriptive statistics and estimates provided in this paper
suggest that micro-regional units such as municipalities have to reduce tax
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rates on profits much more dramatically to be able to attract any foreign-
owned firms than estimates at the country (see Hines, 1999; de Mooij and
Ederveen, 2003, 2006, 2008, for an overview) or even the macro-regional
level (see Slemrod, 1990; Hines, 1996) would suggest. Aggregate bilateral
FDI activity of MNEs is known to display a semi-elasticity of between -1 and
-3.5 according to the aforementioned work. Elasticities estimated from sub-
national macro-regional data are higher than those obtained at the aggregate
level (see Slemrod, 1990; Hines, 1996, for examples and de Mooij and Ed-
erveen, 2003, for pointing to this fact). In comparison to both country-level
and macro-regional work, the estimated business tax elasticities on foreign
investments in this paper are relatively high.
However, using regional data with a finer granularity unveils that there is
an enormous heterogeneity in regional entities with regard to their ability to
attract foreign firms, which display a very high degree of subnational spatial
concentration. In spite of the high estimated tax elasticity, most German
municipalities would have to reduce their business tax rates for the sake of
attracting only a single foreign firm to an extent that does not seem finan-
cially viable. The latter suggests that tax competition for lumpy investments
is a game for a small number of municipalities. Our findings indicate that a
marginal reduction of business tax rates in the average municipality is not
enough to attract foreign MNEs. Municipality size and the availability of
workers, especially skilled workers, are important. Only those municipalities
which have a sufficiently attractive non-tax environment for foreign MNEs
will be able to attract such firms by reasonable reductions in their tax rates.
Municipalities with less favorable non-tax environments would have to trade
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these off with unrealistically large reductions in the business tax rate. For
instance, the IV Poisson estimates in Table 1.3 imply that a one-percent re-
duction in business tax rates increases the number of foreign-owned firms in
a region by about 0.45. Hence, the preferred model indicates that the aver-
age municipality has to reduce its tax rate by about 15% (or 2.2 percentage
points) to attract a single such firm. The average municipality may not want
to do so, since the associated losses in tax income from national firms may
easily outweigh the expected raise of tax income collected from the foreign
MNE.
The elasticities on employees and fixed assets in the upper block of Table
1.5 suggest that a 2.2 percentage-point reduction of the tax rate would raise
employment in foreign-owned firms by about 157 and fixed assets by about
6.28 million Euro. For the average municipality not hosting a foreign-owned
firm prior to the reduction of the tax rate, these figures would represent
the stock of employees and fixed assets of foreign-owned firms after the tax
reduction.
Suppose one would apply estimates of tax semi-elasticities (on FDI) as found
in country-level or macro-regional work in the literature, say, of −3.3 as in
de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) in order to predict numbers of foreign MNEs
in Germany. Recall that the corresponding semi-elasticity was about −60 in
the IV Poisson model. Then, a municipality would have to lower its business
tax rate by almost 40 percentage points or about 280% (i.e., way below zero;
corresponding to a business tax subsidy) in order to attract a single foreign-
owned firm. Even when applying this concept to fixed assets rather than firm
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number counts, such an exercise clearly suggests that semi-elasticities which
are relatively robust across country-samples, time, and methods applied are
not applicable when considering micro-regional location decisions of foreign-
owned firms.
1.7 Concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence on the impact of profit taxation for the location
of foreign-owned firms using data for more than 11, 000 German municipali-
ties. We link data on local public finance and other municipality characteris-
tics available from the German Statistical Office and the Federal Employment
Agency with firm-level data from the German Central Bank about inbound
foreign direct investments in Germany for the years 2001-2005.
One advantage of this data-set is that institutional characteristics and the
taxation of other factors are much more homogeneous across municipalities
within a country than in cross-country studies. Moreover, the number of mu-
nicipalities foreign MNEs may locate in is larger by more than one order of
magnitude than the number of countries for which profit taxes are typically
available. So, the impact of profit taxes on the location of legally indepen-
dent foreign-owned firms may be identified much more precisely than in an
international context.
Overall, we find that the business tax rate levied by a municipality nega-
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tively affects the number of MNEs it can attract as well as their employment
and fixed assets invested. This impact is found after controlling for other
important determinants of a foreign MNE’s location decision. Irrespective
of whether we assume that business tax rates are endogenous or not, the
elasticities of numbers and magnitudes of investments to business tax rates
are reasonably high. As a matter of fact, the average German municipality
was not able to attract any legally independent foreign-owned firm at all
over the years covered by our data. Such a municipality would have to lower
its business tax rate by about 15 percent (or 2.2 percentage points) to lure
only one foreign MNE into its jurisdiction, according to our results. It is
very likely that the associated gains in taxes collected from the foreign MNE
would be lower than the losses the average municipality encountered from
foregone business tax revenues collected from national enterprises.
Obviously, most municipalities do not find this attractive, since foreign cap-
ital is not the only important profit tax base to consider. However, larger
municipalities with an abundant workforce, especially of skilled workers, may
attract foreign MNEs by much smaller changes in their tax rates. Implicitly,
these results suggest that municipalities with generally favorable environ-
ments for firm location should be able to use their tax rates more successfully
to attract foreign MNEs than those with less favorable environments.
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Abstract∗
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are one of the few policy instruments
countries can use to directly attract foreign investment. Previous research
aimed at a quantification of the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment
at aggregated levels only. By contrast, this paper delivers an anatomy of
BITs’ effects on multinational activity at the micro level. We hope that
this strategy will improve our understanding of the precise channels through
which BITs determine aggregate investment. Using data on the foreign activ-
ity of the universe of German multinationals, we provide descriptive evidence
on changes in intensive and extensive margins of multinational firm activity
around the adoption of BITs. The results of multivariate empirical models
broadly support the hypotheses derived from a parsimonious model of het-
erogeneous firms on the effects of BITs on different margins of investment:
BITs raise the number of multinational firms active in a particular host coun-
try and have a positive effect on the number of plants per firm, as well as on
FDI stocks and fixed assets per firm.
2.1 Introduction
While tax policy and even trade policy are known to have an indirect im-
pact on multinational firms’ (MNEs’) location decisions, bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) constitute an instrument which is directly targeted towards
foreign investors. As with other bilateral agreements – such as modern pref-
erential trade agreements or environmental agreements – the cradle of BITs
lies in the 1950s: the first BIT was adopted in 1959 between Germany and
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Peter Egger. The corresponding paper “BITs
Bite: An Anatomy of the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Multinational Firms”
is forthcoming in Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Pakistan.1 Since then, BITs have been signed and ratified seemingly at an
exponential rate of growth which has not yet come to a halt: UNCTAD
(2000, p. 1) reports the number of BITs to be 165 by the end of 1979 and
1,857 at the end of 1999; almost 2,500 BITs have been concluded until the
end of 2005 (UNCTAD, 2006), in 2006 – on average – more than one BIT
was concluded per week (see Sauvant, 2008), and by the end of 2007 the total
number of BITs signed in the past was a stunning 2,608 (UNCTAD, 2008).
By June 2007, six countries had adopted 100 BITs or more, and this list
was headed by Germany with 135 BITs concluded (see Sachs and Sauvant,
2009a).
The matter of BITs is by now an intensively-studied topic.2 Yet, practi-
cally everything we know about their quantitative impact on the target they
aim for – foreign investments – is based on aggregate levels of analysis (see
Sauvant and Sachs, 2009b, for an overview and Hallward Driemeier, 2003;
1Just one year before that, in 1958, the Treaties of Rome entered into force among
the six members of the European Economic Community (EEC), EURATOM, and the
European Community on Steal and Coal (ECSC) which were the predecessors of today’s
European Union (EU). The first multilateral environmental agreement has been concluded
in 1960 among 8 countries.
2The last years have seen a number of books on BITs and their role for foreign investors
(see UNCTAD, 1998, 2000, 2006; Chiswick-Patterson and Sauvant, 2008; Sauvant and
Sachs, 2009b). The number of articles in academic journals tells a similar story. A search
conducted on March 9, 2010, about the terms “Bilateral investment treaties” across all
journals and years covered by JSTOR gave 1,545 hits for all disciplines (211 hits for
economics only). Most of them pertained to articles published within the last decade.
A refined search for an overlap of “Bilateral investment treaties” and “Foreign direct
investment” still gave 1,107 hits in all disciplines. Of those, 164 pertained to economics,
657 to political science, and 198 to law (obviously, these categories are not mutually
exclusive). A similar search for such an overlap in Google Scholar even gave 3,080 hits.
Even when considering all the problems associated with such crude routines, these numbers
are indicative of the broad research interest in the topic.
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Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman, 2005; for recent examples).3
From a theoretical point of view, bilateral investments of MNEs should in-
crease with the adoption of BITs (see UNCTAD, 2000, 2006; Elkins, Guzman,
and Simmons, 2006; and others). According to Sachs and Sauvant (2009a, p.
36-37) the basic purpose of BITs from the perspective of capital-importing
countries is to “help to attract FDI ” while their purpose from the viewpoint
of capital-exporting countries is to “protect investors from political risks and
instability and, more generally, safeguard the investments made by its nation-
als in the territory of the other state.” Broadly speaking, empirical evidence
at the level of bilateral aggregate stocks of foreign investments on the effects
of BITs is mixed (see Sauvant and Sachs, 2009b, for an overview). A host
of questions related to the detailed effects of BITs on extensive margins of
foreign investment (e.g., the number of a parent country’s firms or plants per
host country in response to the adoption of BITs) or intensive margins of for-
eign investment (e.g., the amount of investments or the number of employees
per firm) commemorates a gaping hole in the debate about the consequences
of BITs for investors and investments.
This paper aims at contributing to the debate by providing micro-level evi-
dence on the effects of BITs on the bilateral activity of MNEs. Among the
advantages of a micro-level study of the impact of BITs on MNE activity are
3Similar conclusions apply for other bilateral agreements such as tax treaties (see,
e.g., Blonigen and Davies (2004), preferential trade agreements (see, e.g., Globerman and
Shapiro, 1999; Levi Yeyati, Stein, and Daude, 2003), or environmental agreements (see,
e.g., Naughton, 2007).
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(i) the possible distinction of effects on the aforementioned various extensive
margins of investment and (ii) the opportunity of guarding against hetero-
geneity across firms and the associated aggregation bias which may conceal
possibly countervailing effects of BITs at various margins of firm activity.
We investigate effects of BITs on foreign investments by German firms, us-
ing the data-set Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank.4 The data-set accounts for all foreign investments
of German individuals or companies abroad – by host country and sector –
above a certain balance sheet total.5 Our first goal is to provide descriptive
evidence on changes in extensive and intensive margins of investment around
events of an adoption of new BITs. In particular, we shed light on such
changes with host countries where BITs were adopted and control countries
where no BITs had been adopted at the time.
Apart from providing exploratory descriptive evidence, we estimate multi-
variate empirical models to quantify effects of BITs on various margins of
investment. We rationalize the expected results of BITs on the number of
firms in a country and on the different outcomes per firm with a parsimonious
model of heterogeneous firms. To the extent that BITs reduce firm and plant
fixed costs of investing in a particular host country, we should expect BITs
to raise the number of MNEs active in that country as well as the number
4The German Central Bank. The data-set is made available under strict conditions
and for clearly defined academic research purposes and can be used exclusively at Bank’s
Research Center.
5A detailed description of the data and the reporting requirements is found in Section
4.
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of plants per firm. The derived hypotheses are broadly supported by the
regression results. Signing and ratifying BITs raises the number of firms in
the average host country and year in our sample by 26 units. On average,
these firms will open only a single plant. The inception of a BIT reduces the
fixed costs of investing in a typical host country and year by about 3.7 mn.
Euro.
We will proceed by highlighting key features and expected effects of BITs on
investment in the next section. In section 2.3 we sketch a simple model of het-
erogeneous MNEs to illustrate the expected effect of BITs on the number of
firms active as well as the number of plants per firm and on sales per firm and
host country. Section 2.4 presents the data-set and summarizes the findings
from descriptive evidence. In section 2.5 we strive for a quantification of the
effects of BITs on extensive margins of investment such as numbers of firms,
in intermediate margins of investment such as the number of sectors firms
operate in a particular host country, and in intensive margins of investment
such as firm size in terms of numbers of plants, foreign direct investments,
fixed assets, total assets, or employment. The last section concludes with a
summary of the main findings.
2.2 The Aim and Content of BITs
BITs are the main international instrument used to protect and promote
investments by nationals or companies of one contracting party in the ter-
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ritory of the other contracting party.6 By providing protection to foreign
investments under international law, BITs reduce the political risks of the
foreign investor in the host country and may promote FDI to signatory host
countries by improving their investment climate.7
Although they vary across countries, all BITs cover four main areas: admis-
sion of foreign investments, treatment, expropriation, and dispute settlement.
The first BITs signed focused on the protection of investments. Only later on
BITs started emphasizing the promotion of investments, claiming that BITs
– through such investments – would increase the economic development and
prosperity of the contracting parties.8
BITs stipulate standards of treatment that foreign investments are to receive
in the host country. The principal general standards cover fair and equi-
table treatment, national treatment, and the most favored nation (MFN)
standard.9 BITs also include provisions dealing with the free transfer of
6Past efforts to reach a multinational agreement on investment didn’t succeed. For
example in the framework of the Havana Charter in 1947 which never entered into force,
and in failed negotiations in the 1990s within the OECD. For an account on the history
of international investment agreements see Vandevelde (2009).
7UNCTAD (1998).
8The contracting countries usually state their intentions and objectives in a preamble,
which is important for the interpretation of the treaty (e.g., see the preamble of the BIT
between Germany and Bangladesh). Recently, the increase in the number of investment
disputes led in some cases to the explicit formulation that the promotion and protection
of investments should not be sought at the expense of public interests such as health,
national security, environment and labor (see UNCTAD 2006, p.3).
9For an assessment of each one of those in the context of BITs, see Muchlinski (2009).
Most BITs include some exceptions to the MFN standard, excluding privileges granted to
third states by virtue of membership in a customs union, a common market or free trade
area, or a double taxation agreement.
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payments, conditions under which an expropriation is considered lawful, and
compensations in case of expropriation, armed conflict, or internal disorder.
Most importantly, BITs include dispute settlement provisions. These ensure
the effective implementation and enforcement of the treaty, so as to reduce
uncertainty to foreign investors, and “constitute one of the key elements in
diminishing the country risk, and thus encourage investors of one contracting
party to invest in the territory of the other” (UNCTAD, 2006, p.99).
In short, BITs provide transparency with respect to all non-commercial risks
investors face when investing abroad, and thus lower the fixed costs of such
investments. For example, the right given to investors to initiate arbitral pro-
ceedings against a state (one of the most powerful devices of BITs), relieves
investors from the need to use that country’s domestic courts, and from the
related costs that would follow suit.10
2.3 Theoretical Background
To illustrate the expected effect of BITs on on various firm margins, we sketch
a simple model of heterogeneous firms and associate the conclusion of a BIT
with a reduction in the fixed costs of investing in a foreign market.
10While arbitration in an international tribunal is costly, those costs are easier to antic-
ipate than the ones related to a dispute at domestic courts of a host country with weak
law enforcement and legal institutions.
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Assume that households may be characterized by a love of variety and firms
generally engage in monopolistic competition. Firms are heterogeneous and
differ with regard to their productivity 'i (as in Melitz, 2003), and the
amount of labor needed to produce q units of output is Lij =
qij
'i
+ Fij,
where Fij are fixed costs associated with production in foreign market j.
Each monopolist firm faces a demand curve xij = p
−¾
ij YjP
¾−1
j with constant
elasticity ¾, where pij is the price at which the firm sells its output to con-
sumers in country j, and Yj and Pj are aggregate demand and the consumer
price index in the sector firm i operates in at market j. Firms charge the
same markup ¾
¾−1 over marginal costs, setting the price pij =
¾
(¾−1)'i , where
we normalize the wage rate to one.
Suppose that profits of horizontal MNEs in some parent country may be
decomposed additively into the profits across plants ℓ at home and abroad.11
We assume Fij = fℓnij + fj, where fℓ is the cost of setting up a plant in
country j, nij the number of plants firm i has in country j, and fj are fixed
costs of entering foreign market j. Then, firm i makes profits ¼ij in market
j according to
¼ij = pijxij − xij
'i
− fℓnij − fj. (2.1)
With free entry, the marginal firm will earn exactly zero profits with the first
11Allowing for more complex integration strategies such as export-platform MNEs (see
Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007) would unnecessarily complicate the subsequent
analysis for our purpose which is primarily to provide empirical evidence on the conse-
quences of BITs for MNEs at the micro level.
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plant. Then, the marginal firm’s output is determined as
¼ij = 0 ⇒ x¼=0ij = '∗(¾ − 1)(fℓ + fj), (2.2)
and is associated with the minimum productivity level '∗ required to enter
foreign market j.
Now, assume there is a maximum plant size that can be maintained. Let
xℓ denote the maximum plant size and fℓ = f
∗
ℓ if xij < xℓ, while fℓ = ∞ if
xij ≥ xℓ. This assumption establishes the notion of optimal plant size in the
most parsimonious way. Also, it is consistent with monitoring costs for plant
managers getting excessive beyond a certain plant size. If demand exceeds
xℓ, the firm has to decide whether to sell xℓ or set up a second affiliate
(or several ones) in market j, provided it can cover the fixed costs of the
additional plant(s) with the respective sales.12
Suppose firm i faces demand of nijxℓ > xij > (nij − 1)xℓ in market j. It will
then either operate (nij − 1) plants and produce (nij − 1)xℓ units of output
or set up nij plants and produce xij. In case it sets up (nij − 1) plants, its
profits are
¼n−1ij = (pij −
1
'i
)xℓ(nij − 1)− fℓ(nij − 1)− fj,
12Unlike in most other models of MNEs (see Markusen, 2002; Barba Navaretti and
Venables, 2004), this will lead to MNEs with multiple plants in one market.
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and if it sets up n plants, profits become
¼nij = (pij −
1
'i
)xij − fℓnij − fj.
The corresponding difference in profits amounts to
¼nij − ¼n−1ij = [xij − xℓ(nij − 1)](pij −
1
'i
)− fℓ. (2.3)
Hence, firm i will set up nij plants in j whenever
¼nij − ¼n−1ij ≥ 0 ⇔ [xij − xℓ(nij − 1)](pij −
1
'i
) ≥ fℓ, (2.4)
that is, if the extra revenue achieved by opening the next plant is enough to
cover the extra fixed costs associated with it.
Actual supply of firm i with nij plants in country j in equilibrium will then
be
x̃ij =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(nij − 1)xℓ + xℓ if ¼nij − ¼n−1ij ≥ 0
nijxℓ if ¼
n+1
ij − ¼nij < 0
Where xℓ is the output of the last plant, which has not reached its maximum
plant size. If the fixed costs of opening the last plant can not be covered,
xℓ will not be produced and denotes the difference between demand and the
actual supply of firm i. Of course, bounded firm size complicates the analysis
of models with MNEs (in general and even in partial equilibrium). However,
when associating the existence of BITs with a reduction of fℓ (and fj) in such
a framework, the above parsimonious framework is helpful to shed light on
most of the testable hypotheses investigated below in a straightforward way,
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without delivering a full-blown analysis of the model in general equilibrium.
2.3.1 Effects of BITs on the Extensive and Intensive
Foreign Firm Margin:
Associate the inception of a BIT between the parent country of foreign firm
i with a proportional reduction of fj and fℓ and consider the effects on the
number of firms in country j (extensive margin), and on the number of plants,
profits and sales of firm i in country j (intensive margin).
Lower market entry costs fj and plant fixed costs fℓ (associated with the
inception of a BIT) will reduce the minimum productivity '∗ required to
enter foreign market j and, hence, sales of the marginal firm. The marginal
firm after inception of a BIT will make zero profits but the marginal firm as
of before inception of a BIT will make positive profits with a BIT in place.
Therefore, a BIT will cause new firms to enter j. Equation (2.3) suggests
that a reduction in the fixed costs of setting up a plant in j, induced by
the implementation of a BIT, will increase the profit difference ¼nij − ¼n−1ij at
any nij. Given the distribution of productivity 'i, there will always be some
firms for which any given reduction in fℓ will make it profitable to set up a
new plant and expand production. Hence, there will be entry of new plants
and expansion of production both by firms already present in j prior to the
BIT and by new MNEs who set up their first plant in that market.
These effects are depicted in Figure 2.1. The corresponding figure contains
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Figure 2.1: Profits of a multinational firm in host country j, before and after
the inception of a BIT
two nonmonotonic schedules, one reflecting a profit function prior to a BIT
(at the outer right) and one reflecting a profit function after the inception
of a BIT (at the outer left). This illustrates that the effects on the plant-
specific and firm-specific output differ across brackets of the firm productivity
distribution. At productivity levels '∗,BITi ≤ 'i < '∗,no BITi , inception of a
BIT has an effect on the extensive margin, causing firm as well as plant entry.
To the right of '∗,no BITi , adjustments on the intensive margin of firm activity
will raise per-firm output and may imply an increase or a decline of per-plant
production.
At productivity levels 'i ∈ [B
1
¾−1 , C
1
¾−1 ), 'i ∈ [F
1
¾−1 , G
1
¾−1 ), etc., there
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would be plant entry along with an expansion in production: output, sales,
and profit per firm would increase while output, sales, and profit
per plant would decline. At productivity levels 'i ∈ ['∗,no BITi , A
1
¾−1 ), 'i ∈
[D
1
¾−1 , E
1
¾−1 ), 'i ∈ [H
1
¾−1 , I
1
¾−1 ), etc., the number of firms and number of
plants remain constant but plant-specific and firm-specific output, sales, and
profits change: they increase both at the firm level (per firm) and at the
plant level (per plant). Finally, at productivity levels 'i ∈ [A
1
¾−1 , B
1
¾−1 ),
'i ∈ [E
1
¾−1 , F
1
¾−1 ), etc., there would be no change whatsoever.
Overall, in response to the inception of a BIT between a parent and a host
country, we expect an increase in the number of firms and in the number
of plants (both aggregate and per-firm) of a given parent country in host
market j. We also expect an increase in aggregate output and revenue, and
in profits of a subset of the firms as well as for the average existing MNE of
a given parent country in host market j.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
To shed light on the effects of BITs on the different margins of MNE activity,
we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) data-set provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank which comprises the universe of outward FDI (above
the reporting threshold) undertaken by German MNEs. All German firms
holding 10% or more of shares or voting rights in foreign firms with a balance
sheet total of more than 3 mn. Euro are required by law to report to Deutsche
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Bundesbank their balance sheet information as well as information on the
sector, legal form, and number of employees.13 Indirect participating interests
are to be reported whenever residents hold more than 50% in a foreign firm
and these dependent enterprises themselves hold 10% or more of the shares
or voting rights in other foreign enterprises. Our sample period covers 1996-
2005.
Before turning to regression analysis, let us shed light on the evolution of
MNE activity around BIT (signature or ratification) events. For this, con-
sider the number of German MNEs per country, and the number of plants
per firm and country around such events. In particular, we inspect the evolu-
tion of MNE activity in the average host country with a treatment (signature
or ratification of a BIT) within the sample period as compared to a control
group (i.e., firms in countries which never got treated or did so before 1996).
Notice that BIT treatment (irrespective of signature or ratification) is un-
equally spaced in time. Hence, some countries signed or ratified BITs at the
beginning and others in the center or the end of the sample period. To align
units of observation properly, we center them around an artificial treatment
time zero when a BIT was signed or ratified. Then, we follow the evolution
of MNE activity in treated countries (referred to as Treated in subsequent
figures) up to two years before and after treatment. We do so also with MNE
activity in untreated countries in the same years (referred to as Controls in
subsequent figures).
13The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
Reporting thresholds have been changed in the past, for details and a documentation on
the micro-level data set MiDi see Lipponer (2009).
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Figure 2.2: Number of firms at the country level around signature of a BIT
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Figure 2.3: Number of firms at the country level around ratification of a BIT
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Figure 2.4: Number of affiliates by firm and country around signature of a
BIT
In Figures 2.2 and 2.3 we focus on the number of firms in a host country,
which most closely reflect decisions at the extensive margin as discussed in
Section 2.3. While Figure 2.2 suggests a discontinuity in average outcome
around the time of signature of a BIT, Figure 2.3 indicates that there is
a trend in outcome – with a different slope – around treatment time zero
which looks similar before and after treatment. Altogether, these two figures
suggest that BIT signatures lead to an increase in the number of firms active
in a host country around treatment, but we should not expect an effect of
similar magnitude for ratification afterwards.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 display the number of plants per firm and host country.
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Figure 2.5: Number of affiliates by firm and country around ratification of a
BIT
We focus on a constant number of firms around treatment in each figure.14
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that, at the intensive firm margin, a clear increase
in the number of foreign affiliates per firm and host country happens around
the ratification but less so around the signature of BITs. graphical inspection
unconditional on other influences and can not provide causal evidence about
the effect of BITs on outcome.15 Therefore, we move on to an econometric
14Changes at the extensive firm margin as in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 could not have an
impact on Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
15Also, recall that BITs with many of the important host countries of Germany had been
signed before the sample period. The countries with new BITs are among the smaller
recipients of German investment abroad. It is impossible to infer external validity of
the effect of BITs for the past and, hence, the ones with Germany’s most important
host countries. Yet, high-quality, census-type micro-data on MNEs are available only for
relatively recent time spans in any developed country we know of.
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exploration which has the greater potential of isolating causal effects of BIT
treatment. In our benchmark regressions, we treat the binary BIT indicator
as exogenous conditional on a set of covariates, as we expect the average
firm investing abroad to take the inception of a BIT as given. Beyond that,
we consider some regressions in a subsample of treated and control countries
which are similar in terms of their propensity of signing a BIT with Germany.
The latter is capable of reducing a potential bias of the average BIT treatment
effect on outcome accruing to self selection. In the appendix, we present
results which suggest that there is no evidence of such a bias with the data
and specifications at hand so that we may interpret the estimate effects as
causal ones.
2.5 Regression Analysis
2.5.1 Econometric Model
In this section we proceed by running multivariate empirical models to quan-
tify effects of BITs. We are interested in the partial effects of the signature
and ratification of BITs on the conditional mean of different outcomes of firm
i in host country j. In particular, we look at the number of affiliates held,
number of employees abroad, FDI stock,16 fixed assets, turnover, and the
number of sectors firm i operates in. We estimate multiplicative individual-
16Measured according to the IMF/OECD method.
Chapter 2 – BITs Bite 77
effects models for the conditional mean of the form
E[yijt∣x′j,t−1, ºij] = exp(x′j,t−1¯)ºij
where yijt is the outcome of firm i in host country j, ij = 1, ..., N in year
t = 1, ..., T , xj,t−1 is a K × 1 vector of variables dated at time t − 1 which
vary across both host countries and years, ¯ is a corresponding K× 1 vector
of parameters to be estimated, and ºij is a permanent scaling factor for the
individual, firm-by-host-country specific mean – an unobservable variable.
We can consistently estimate the parameter vector ¯ even if unobserved
components in ºij are correlated with the regressors x
′
j,t−1 by using a Poisson
conditional maximum likelihood estimator (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches,
1984).
The advantage of the Poisson fixed effects estimator pertains to the sum of
the outcomes in the panel being a sufficient statistic for ºij: after conditioning
on
∑
t yijt the conditional likelihood does not depend on ºij, and ¯ can be
estimated consistently. With the conditional mean correctly specified, the
Poisson fixed effects estimator is consistent regardless of whether the data
are Poisson distributed or not (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Since all
elements in x′j,t−1 vary across host countries and time but not firms, we
correct the covariance matrix for clustering (see Wooldridge, 1999).
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2.5.2 Specification and Data
The vector xj,t−1 of determinants of firm i’s activity in host country j includes
the following variables. In particular, BITSIGj,t−1 and BITRATj,t−1 are at
the heart of our analysis. These are dummy variables which indicate whether
Germany signed or ratified a BIT with country j in year t−1, respectively.17
We collect information about signature and ratification of BITs by and with
Germany from the online database of the United Nations’ Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
There is clear-cut evidence that host country market size matters (see Bloni-
gen, Davies, and Head, 2003). Therefore, we include GDPj,t−1, the log of
real GDP of host country j in year t − 1.18 Data on GDPj,t−1 are collected
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2009 (with 2000 as
the base year). Similarly, a broad line of research indicates that skilled la-
bor endowments are important for foreign plant set-up (see Carr, Markusen,
17Firm outcome observed in period t, such as the number of affiliates held, foreign
employment, FDI, and fixed assets should respond in general to economic fundamentals
observed in the previous period, t − 1, rather than to contemporaneous values. The
statutory corporate tax rate could however be anticipated by the firm. Yet, the results
remain unchanged if we use the contemporaneous tax rate instead of the lagged one. We
ran regressions which enforced contemporaneous effects of all variables and those were
smaller on average than the ones based on period t− 1.
18Some work suggests that market potential should be included instead or – as far as
third-country foreign market potential is concerned – along with GDPj,t−1 (see Head and
Mayer, 2004). However, for the data at hand, foreign market potential – an inverse-
distance weighted or trade-flow weighted version of GDPj,t−1 across third host countries
– does not exhibit much host-country-specific time variation so that the corresponding
parameter estimate would be insignificant. Employing sector-level data would lead to a
tremendous loss of observations (service output and even manufacturing output by sector
is not available for as large a host country sample as the one considered here) so that we
dismiss their use.
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and Maskus, 2001; Blonigen, Davies, and Head, 2003), and so are capital-
labor ratios (see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). To control for such influ-
ences, we include SKILLj,t−1, the tertiary school enrollment rate in country
j and year t−1 (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators), and
KLRATj,t−1, the capital-labor ratio (from Bergstrand and Egger, 2007).
A number of empirical studies suggested that statutory tax rates of a host
country affect MNE activity there (see, e.g., Mutti and Grubert, 2004).
Therefore, we include TAXj,t−1, the statutory corporate tax rate in coun-
try j at time t − 1, as a control variable (from the Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
mentation). Similarly, there is work on the role of double taxation treaties
for MNE activity (see Blonigen and Davies, 2004, for an analysis at the ag-
gregate level and Davies, Norbäck, and Tekin-Koru, 2009, for micro-level
evidence). Accordingly, we include DTTj,t−1 in our specification – a dummy
variable indicating whether Germany had a double taxation treaty in force
with country j in year t− 1 or not (information about DTTj,t−1 stems from
Germany’s Federal Ministry of Finance). Finally, some empirical work sug-
gests that the existence of a free trade area with a host country fosters FDI of
a parent there and vice versa (see Blomström and Kokko, 1997; Levi Yeyati,
Stein, and Daude, 2003). Accordingly, we control for PTAj,t−1, a dummy
indicating if there is a costums union or a free trade agreement in place with
country j at time t−1 (information about PTAj,t−1 is collected from various
sources and comes from Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch, 2009).
Table 2.1 provides the first and second moment of the distribution of the de-
pendent and independent variables for the firm-by-country-level data and for
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the country-level data. The first one covers 15, 728 firm-host pairs and 99, 322
observations, while the second one covers 86 host countries and 699 observa-
tions. Altogether, our sample covers 5, 616 unique firms and 86 unique host
countries. So, for the sample period of 1996-2005, there are 86 ⋅ 10 = 860
possible data points about numbers of firms across host countries and years
(including zeros), 5, 616 ⋅ 86 = 482, 976 possible firm-by-host-country dyads,
and 4, 829, 760 firm-by-host-country-by-year observations. However, the con-
trol variables (especially, the statutory corporate tax rate) are not available
for all host countries and years which leads to a drop in the number of usable
host-country-by-year observations from 860 to 699. Moreover, in the regres-
sion analysis, we can only estimate parameters from cross-sectional units
whose outcome changes (i.e., all permanent zero investments are deleted).
The latter leads to a drop of usable firm-by-host-country dyads from 482, 976
to 15, 728 (for the number of foreign affiliates) so that the number of usable
observations drops to 99, 322.
Let us discuss a few selected descriptive statistics and leave the rest to the
interested reader. The figures in the table suggest that, on average, a firm
holds 0.778 affiliates per host country. This number is below unity, since
we use a complete design matrix: the data used in the regressions cover all
possible firm-by-host-country dyads where some change occurred during the
sample period (all other firm-by-host-country dyads are dropped by condi-
tioning out the fixed effects). There are firms which did not hold an affiliate
in a particular host country at the beginning of but set one up during the
sample period. Hence, there are numerous zeros for firms prior to investing
in a host country during the sample period. Those zeros and the fact that
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many MNEs run only one plant in a host country reduces the average num-
ber of affiliates to less than one for the average firm, host country, and year.
Firms operate in less than one sector per host country and year for the same
reason. However, the average number of sectors (0.735) is smaller than the
average number of affiliates (0.778). This points to the fact that multiple
foreign affiliates of one parent company in a host country tend to operate in
the same or at least in overlapping sectors. The average number of firms per
host country is somewhat less than 113.
Furthermore, in the average host country and year, a German MNE holds a
stock of FDI of slightly more than 11 mn. Euro which corresponds to about
7.5 mn. Euro of fixed assets.19 On average, there are about 126 employees
per firm, host country, and year who generate sales of, on average, almost 32
mn. Euro.
The independent variables suggest the following pattern. First, about 32%
(27%) of the host countries the average German MNE in the sample invests
in, in an average year, has signed (ratified) a BIT with Germany. In the left
bloc of the table, all statistics are by firm, host country and year. Hence,
the higher numbers for BITSIG and BITRAT in the right bloc of the table
suggest that German MNEs display less presence in host countries with BITs
than otherwise. This has to do with the fact that regulations in some pref-
erential trade agreements (such as European Union membership) establish
19As indicated by the table footnote, FDI stocks, fixed assets, and turnover are expressed
in 100, 000 Euro.
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investor protection so that enacting a BIT would be superfluous.20 Accord-
ing to the statistics in the table, Germany signed (ratified) a BIT with 68%
(56%) of the host countries in the sample.21 With respect to double taxation
treaties and preferential trade agreements it is the other way round: German
multinationals are present with higher frequency in countries Germany has
taxation or trade agreements with. German MNEs even seem to invest with
slightly higher probability in high-tax countries than in low-tax economies.
2.5.3 Regression Results
Let us move on to Poisson fixed effects QML regressions which may be in-
terpreted as to reflect structural forms of the expressions of the extensive
and intensive margins in a model as the one outlined in Section 2.3.22 These
regressions condition on the potential impact of other covariates whose im-
pact on firm activity could conceal or at least bias the role of BITs for the
20OECD member countries attract the majority of German FDI stocks. These countries
typically do not conclude BITs among each other.
21Table 2.4 lists all countries in the sample and the year of eventual signature and
ratification of a BIT with Germany.
22The extensive and the intensive margins may be formulated as log-linear functions of
market size, trade costs, production costs, fixed costs (see Chaney, 2008), and profitability
through profit taxes. We model host country market size as being proportional to host
country GDP (as said before, market potential as a possible alternative measure does not
vary enough in our panel data models), trade costs as a function of PTA membership
(time-invariant trade costs are controlled for by fixed effects), production costs as being
proportional to GDP, skilled labor ratios, and capital-labor ratios), and fixed costs by
BITs signing and ratification as well as the existence of double taxation treaties which
inter alia determine the deductibility of fixed costs from the tax base time-invariant fixed
set-up costs are controlled for by fixed effects), and profitability is co-determined by profit
tax rates and double taxation treaties.
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relevant outcome. Let us summarize our findings in Table 2.2 for the exten-
sive firm margin and in Table 2.3 for the extensive affiliate margin and other
outcomes. From a firm’s perspective, we consider all outcome variables in
Table 2.3 as to reflect dimensions of the intensive margin.
In Table 2.2, the dependent variable reflects the number of firms per host
country and year. Accordingly, the cross-sectional dimension in that table
are the 86 host countries covered. In this case, there are 699 observations
altogether (see Subsection 2.5.2). The parameter estimates suggest the fol-
lowing conclusions.
First, all of the statistically significant estimates are aligned with our expec-
tations. Higher host country statutory tax rates reduce a firm’s propensity
of investing there, larger market size (GDP) and the availability of skilled
labor raise the propensity of investing there. The main reason for why capital
labor ratios do not turn out significant is their high correlation with GDP
and skilled labor endowments in the sample. There is also an explanation
for why double tax treaties and preferential trade agreements do not display
a significant positive impact: most of the countries German multinationals
changed their investments in (by investing or divesting there) over the sample
period already had such agreements with Germany prior to 1996.
This is different for BIT signature and ratification. Controlling for the ob-
servable variables, we are able to estimate parameters on both BITSIGj,t−1
and BITRATj,t−1 which are significantly different from zero. Unlike in Fig-
ures 2.2 and 2.3, we are able to identify a significant positive impact of both
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Table 2.2: Number of firms per country (whole sample)
Poisson fixed-effects QML estimation
Dependent variable
firms
BITSIGj,t−1 0.100**
(0.046)
BITRATj,t−1 0.112***
(0.039)
TAXj,t−1 -1.287***
(0.497)
DTTj,t−1 0.040
(0.040)
PTAj,t−1 -0.005
(0.051)
GDPj,t−1 1.598***
(0.376)
SKILLj,t−1 0.740***
(0.203)
KLRATj,t−1 -0.062
(0.158)
Wald 3354
p-value 0.000
Log Likelihood -1779
Observations 699
Host countries 86
Notes: The regression includes time dummies. Robust standard errors reported in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower
part of the table reports the Wald (Â2) test statistic for joint significance of the regressors
and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood function, the number of observations, and
the number of groups (host countries).
BIT signature and ratification on the number of firms investing in a host
country. Hence, omitting changes in explanatory variables from Figures 2.2
and 2.3 mars the impact of treatment on the number of firms in treated
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versus untreated host countries there. Interestingly, the point estimate of
BITRATj,t−1 is even somewhat bigger than the one of BITSIGj,t−1. Yet,
signature of BITs seems to generate non-trivial anticipation effects.
What is the impact of BITs on the number of firms in the average host
country and year? Notice that, with the adopted approach, this ques-
tion can not be answered in the usual way. According to Subsection 2.5.1,
E[yijt∣x′j,t−1, ºij] = exp(x′j,t−1¯)ºij. Hence, the model prediction
E[yijt∣x′j,t−1, ºij] requires an estimate not only of ¯ but also of the fixed
effects ºij. Unlike with linear models, the latter can not easily be retrieved
since they are conditioned out. However, without making any assumption
on ºij, the model implies that ¯k and (e
¯k − 1) can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities in the case of a continuous and a discrete explanatory variable
xk,t−1 respectively .23
The coefficient of BITSIGj,t−1 in Table 2.2 tells us that the signature of a
BIT is associated with a 10% increase in the number of German firms active
in the average host country and year. Lets consider this effect on the sample
mean. In the sample, the average number of German firms active in the
average host country and year amounts to 112.57. Signature of a BIT with
23The marginal effect of a continuous variable xk,t−1 is ∂E[yijt∣x′j,t−1, ºij ]/∂xk,t−1 =
¯k × E[yijt∣x′j,t−1, ºij ], so ¯k can be interpreted as an elasticity. A one-unit increase in
xk,t−1 is associated with a ¯k proportionate increase (or a 100 × ¯k increase in percent)
in the conditional mean of the dependent variable. The effect of a discrete change in
a binary variable, such as BITSIGj,t−1 or BITRATj,t−1, on the conditional mean of
the dependent variable is E[yijt∣z′j,t−1, xk,t−1 = 1, ºij ] − E[yijt∣z′j,t−1, xk,t−1 = 0, ºij ] =
exp(z′j,t−1¯+¯k)ºij−exp(z′j,t−1¯)ºij = (e¯k−1)×E[yijt∣z′j,t−1, ºij ] where z′j,t−1 denotes all
the regressors other than the xk,t−1. The discrete change in a binary variable is associated
with a 100×(e¯k−1) percentage change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable.
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Germany would increase that number from 112.57 to 123.83. Subsequent
ratification of that BIT would ceteris paribus further increase the number
of firms in the average host country from 123.83 to 137.70.24 Notice that it
would take a reduction of the average host country’s statutory corporate tax
rate by almost 8.2 percentage points to achieve the same effect as signature
of a BIT, and it would take a reduction of the corporate tax rate in these
countries of about 18.35 percentage points to achieve the effect of signature
and ratification of a BIT. But, clearly, this is not surprising when we think
BITs reduce the risk of expropriation – and, hence, fixed market entry costs
– from a high level in a significant way.
24Table 2.2 shows that the ratification of a BIT is associated with a further 11.2%
increase in average number of German firms.
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In Table 2.3, we consider a variety of margins of adjustment from a firm’s
perspective. With regard to the number of affiliates per firm, host country,
and year, we obtain the same qualitative result as for the extensive firm
margin in Table 2.2: signature of a BIT raises the number of plants per firm,
host country, and year and ratification of a BIT has an even bigger effect on
top of signature. Notice that the design of the data for Table 2.3 is such that
firms are included if, during the sample period, they set up new or close down
existing plants. Hence, an increase at the plant margin (or other margins in
Table 2.3) can but need not entail a change at the extensive firm margin.
The magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat larger in Table 2.3 than in
Table 2.2. What do these coefficients imply for plant numbers per firm, host
country, and year? Again, we can resort to the logic applied to quantifying
effects of BIT signature and ratification on the extensive firm margin.
According to Table 2.3, signature of a BIT alone raises the number of affiliates
by a factor of exp(0.089) − 1 ≃ 0.093 and subsequent ratification of a BIT
ceteris paribus raises it again by a factor of exp(0.119) − 1 ≃ 0.126 from
there. The average number of foreign subsidiaries in a host country and year
in the sample was 0.778 in Table 2.1. That number is raised to about 0.958
with signature and ratification of a BIT.
We can not discern effects of BIT signature from ratification for FDI stocks,
fixed assets, or turnover, but – except for turnover – all intensive margin
outcomes in Table 2.3 display a positive response to ratification of a BIT
which is significantly different from zero. One reason for why we are not able
to identify effects on turnover is that BITs affect fixed rather than variable
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production costs and it takes time to set up production and generate turnover
after setting up affiliates and hiring employees.25
The regressions for FDI stocks and fixed assets allow for an approximation of
the fixed cost equivalent of BITs. For this, set the parameter of BITSIGj,t−1
to zero for convenience and calculate the effect of BITs on outcome by using
the parameter of BITRATj,t−1. According to the model for FDI stocks and
information on average FDI stocks per host country and year from Table 2.1,
the impact of a BIT on FDI stocks amounts to about 5 mn. Euro. The one
on fixed assets amounts to about 3.7 mn. Euro. Fixed assets are supposed
to be a better measure of fixed costs than FDI stocks. In terms of the above
model, we may conclude that a BIT ceteris paribus reduces fixed costs due
to the reduction in uncertainty of foreign investments by approximately 3.7
mn. Euro in the average host country and year in our sample.
One could investigate the sensitivity of the above results in a number of
ways, and we have aimed at doing so. For instance, rather than using GDP
to measure market size, one could use market potential. Yet, market poten-
tial exhibits much less time variation than GDP and so its impact is harder
to discern from the one of other covariates and the fixed effects in the model.
Also, one could use sector-specific output rather than GDP. With a Cobb-
Douglas upper utility function and Constant Elasticity of Scale lower utility
functions at the sector level, the obtained coefficient of GDP would reflect
25At least, this argument should hold for greenfield investment projects. Unfortunately,
the data at hand do not allow for a distinction of greenfield from brownfield investment
projects.
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the response to an increase in the average sector’s market size. However,
sector-level data (as available from United Nations Industrial Development
Organization’s Industrial Statistics Database) lead to an enormous loss of
observations in both the time and the cross-sectional dimension so that con-
vergence of the adopted procedures could not be achieved. Finally, the pa-
rameters in the model about the extensive firm margin in Table 2.2 could be
affected by self-selection of countries into BITs with Germany. Self-selection
bias could be avoided by restricting the sample to comparable countries (see
the Appendix for details). The corresponding results are similar to those in
Table 2 but the effect of BITs on the number of firms in a host country is
smaller by about one-fifth and significant at 10% rather than at 5%.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper provides novel insights on the impact of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) at the firm level. Using the universe of German multinational
activity abroad for the period 1996-2005, we provide evidence that BITs seem
to bite at various margins of the multinational firm. BITs – as a means of
reducing the fixed costs of investment in (risky) host countries – should affect
the number of firms active as well as the number of plants and sales per firm
and host country.
These hypotheses are broadly confirmed by our evidence from panel data of
one of the biggest foreign investing countries around the world, Germany.
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Data availability forces us to focus on a relatively recent period where BITs
have been signed by Germany with countries that are certainly not the prime
targets of its outward investment (this would be the case for other countries’
firm-level data-sets, too). Yet, we are confident that our analysis provides
novel evidence on the impact of BITs on firm activity which hitherto has
been confined to the aggregate level only. We are able to quantify the fixed
cost equivalent of BITs which amounts to about 3.7 mn. Euro in the typical
host country and year. Signing and ratifying BITs raises the number of firms
in the average host country and year in our sample by 26 units. On average,
treated firms will open only a single plant. The FDI generated by signing
and ratifying a BIT amounts to about 5 mn. Euro per firm and, hence, 130
mn. Euro per host country on average.
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Table 2.4: List of countries in the sample and date of BIT sig-
nature and ratification
Host Country Signed Ratified Host Country Signed Ratified
Algeria 1996 2002 Latvia 1993 1996
Argentina 1991 1993 Lebanon 1997 1999
Armenia* 1995 2000 Lithuania 1992 1997
Australia - - Macedonia, FYR 1996 2000
Austria - - Malaysia 1960 1963
Azerbaijan 1995 1998 Mauritius 1971 1973
Bangladesh 1981 1986 Mexico 1998 2001
Belarus 1993 1996 Moldova 1994 2006
Belgium - - Morocco 2001 -
Bolivia 1987 1990 Netherlands - -
Brazil 1995 - New Zealand - -
Bulgaria 1986 1988 Nicaragua 1996 2001
Cambodia* 1999 2002 Norway - -
Cameroon 1962 1963 Pakistan 1959 1962
Canada - - Panama 1983 1989
Chile 1991 1999 Paraguay 1993 1998
China 2003 2005 Peru 1995 1997
Costa Rica 1994 1998 Philippines 1997 2000
Cote d’Ivoire 1966 1968 Poland 1989 1991
Croatia 1997 2000 Portugal 1980 1982
Czech Republic 1990 1992 Romania 1996 1998
Denmark - - Rwanda* 1967 1969
Dominican Republic - - Russian Federation 1989 1991
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2005 - Saudi Arabia 1996 1999
El Salvador 1997 2001 Senegal 1964 1966
Estonia 1992 1997 Slovak Republic 1990 1992
Finland - - Slovenia 1993 1998
France - - South Africa 1995 1998
Georgia 1993 1998 Spain - -
Ghana 1995 1998 Sweden - -
Greece 1961 1963 Switzerland - -
Guatemala 2003 2005 Tanzania 1965 1968
Honduras 1995 1998 Thailand 2002 2004
Hong Kong, China 1996 1998 Trinidad and Tobago 2006 -
Hungary 1986 1987 Tunisia 1963 1966
India 1995 1998 Turkey 1962 1965
Indonesia 2003 - Uganda 1966 1968
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2002 2005 Ukraine 1993 1996
Ireland - - United Arab Emirates* 1997 1999
Italy - - United Kingdom - -
Japan - - United States - -
Jordan* 1974 1977 Uruguay 1987 1990
Kazakhstan 1992 1995 Uzbekistan 1993 1998
Kenya 1996 2000 Venezuela, RB 1996 1998
Korea, Rep. 1964 1967 Vietnam 1993 1998
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 2006
Notes: * These countries appear in the figures but are dropped in the regressions.
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Appendix
In Table 2.5, we provide information on the same regression as in Table
2.2, but reducing the control group to a subset of countries by means of a
propensity score-matching procedure. We do this as a robustness check in
which we seek to take into account possible selection into treatment. Note
that since we have panel data and the treatment varies over time, as long as
the treatment is uncorrelated with time-varying unobservables that affect the
outcome, the fixed effects method we use allows us to consistently estimate
treatment effects (See Wooldridge 2002, p.638). Still, we can exploit further
information at the country level which we do not use in the main regressions
which determine the likelihood of a country signing a BIT with Germany.
We estimate annual probits for the probability of a country signing a BIT
with Germany 26. Given the estimated propensity scores, we match treated
countries –i.e. countries that signed a BIT with Germany previous or during
our sample period– with untreated countries with a similar mean propensity
score over the years. To select the control set we define a propensity score
radius and use all comparison units within the radius 27.
26The specification of the probability of signing a BIT with Germany in a given year
includes following dependent variables: Bilateral GDP sum, GDP similarity, GDP per
capita similarity and its square, log bilateral distance, a dummy for a border with Germany,
a dummy for being in the same continent, a dummy for a free trade agreement, a measure
of remoteness, difference in capital labor ratio to the rest of the world, and a dummy for
membership to the OECD. Regression results available upon request.
27The radius is defined as the interval between the minimum and maximum propensity
score of all the treated countries.
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Treated countries
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
China, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Algeria, Egypt,
Arab Rep., Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hon-
duras, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iran, Islamic Rep., Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Korea, Rep., Lebanon, Lithuania, Latvia, Mo-
rocco, Moldova, Mexico, Macedonia, Mauritius, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Pak-
istan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania,
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, El Salvador, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa.
Control group - Whole sample
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United
States.
Control group - Radius matching
Dominican Republic, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, New
Zealand, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago.
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Table 2.5: Number of firms per country (Subsample)
Poisson fixed-effects QML estimation
Dependent variable
firms
BITSIGj,t−1 0.088*
(0.048)
BITRATj,t−1 0.031
(0.054)
TAXj,t−1 -2.004***
(0.566)
DTTj,t−1 0.029
(0.074)
PTAj,t−1 -0.082*
(0.049)
GDPj,t−1 0.951**
(0.443)
SKILLj,t−1 0.476
(0.334)
KLRATj,t−1 0.146
(0.171)
Wald 4884
p-value 0.000
Log Likelihood -1362
Observations 605
Host countries 75
Notes: Regression as in Table 2.2, after reducing the sample to a subset of countries by
means of a propensity score-matching procedure. The regression includes time dummies.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower part of the table reports the Wald (Â2) test
statistic for joint significance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood
function, the number of observations, and the number of groups (host countries).
Chapter 2 – BITs Bite 97
Acknowledgements
I thank Peter Egger who is co-author of Chapter 2. Both authors thank
Richard Friberg and two anonymous referees for thoughtful comments. We
are grateful for helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript by Rod
Ludema, Doug Nelson, Horst Raff, and participants of the annual meeting of
the European Trade Study Group in 2009 at Rome. We gratefully acknowl-
edge support by Elisabetta Fiorentino and other members of the research
center of the German Bundesbank.
References
Barba Navaretti, G., and A.J. Venables (2004), Multinational Firms in the
World Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Bergstrand, J.H. and P. Egger (2007), A Knowledge-and-Physical-Capital
Model of International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Foreign
Affiliate Sales: Developed Countries, Journal of International Eco-
nomics 73, 278-308.
Bergstrand, J.H., P. Egger, and M. Larch (2010), Economic Determinants
of the Timing of Preferential Trade Agreement Formations and En-
largements, unpublished manuscript, University of Notre Dame.
Bernard, A.B., S. Redding, and P.K. Schott (2010), Multi-Product Firms
and Product Switching, American Economic Review 100, 70-97.
Blomström, M., and A. Kokko (1997), Regional Integration and Foreign
Direct Investment, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1659.
Chapter 2 – BITs Bite 98
Blonigen, B.A. and R.B. Davies (2004), The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties
on U.S. FDI Activity, International Tax and Public Finance 11, 601-
622.
Blonigen,B.A., R.B. Davies, and K. Head (2003), Estimating the Knowledge-
Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Comment, American
Economic Review 93, 980–994.
Cameron, C.A., and P.K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics Methods and
Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Carr, D.L., J.R. Markusen, and K.E. Maskus (2001), Estimating the Knowledge-
Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise, American Economic
Review 91, 693–708.
Chaney, T. (2008), Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins
of International Trade, American Economic Review 98, 1707-1721.
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Abstract∗
This paper analyzes the impact of statutory corporate tax rates on profits
and of double taxation treaties (DTTs) on multinational firm (MNE) activity
at the micro level. It provides an assessment of the effects of these profit tax
instruments on the extensive and the intensive margin of activity. In par-
ticular, we estimate two-part quasi-maximum likelihood models using panel
data on the foreign activity of German MNEs in the decade 1996-2005 and
find that statutory tax rates affect MNE activity negatively both at the ex-
tensive and the intensive margin of investment, while DTTs primarily induce
a positive effect at the extensive margin.
3.1 Introduction
Profit tax parameters should be among the most important policy instru-
ments to attract mobile firms in the modern era, much more so than trade
policy instruments. The reason is that tariffs have declined tremendously
in the aftermath of World War II and taxing income – in particular from
the taxation of labor and, more recently, of value added, but also of profits
of incorporated firms – now remains almost the only reasonable source to
generate revenues for governments.
While tax rates on labor and value added tend to remain relatively constant
over long periods of time, there is much more action in tax rates on corporate
profits. First of all, with the break-down of the former Soviet Union and
the opening up of the former member countries of the Council for Mutual
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Peter Egger. The corresponding paper “Statu-
tory Corporate Tax Rates and Double Taxation Treaties as Determinants of Multinational
Firm Activity” is published in FinanzArchiv.
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Economic Aid (COMECON), a new source of pressure on the taxes on mobile
firms’ profits has surfaced in Western Europe, which led to a sequence of
associated tax rate reductions since the early 1990s there (see Overesch and
Rincke, 2009, for a documentation of the decline in corporate profit tax
rates in Western Europe). Second, unlike taxes on value added and much
less so than taxes on labor, profit taxation has a considerable international
component through the activity of multinational firms (MNEs).1
In general, international aspects of profit taxation root in the taxation of
foreign-earned profits of MNEs abroad (and sometimes even at home) and in
the existence of double taxation treaties (DTTs). DTTs have three primary
goals: first, they specify the mode of double taxation relief which is relevant
unless a unilateral approach is taken by the parent country;2 second, they
specify tax parameters of interest at the bilateral level such as the withholding
tax rate;3 third, in some cases they establish an agreement about information
exchange so as to limit the scope of tax avoidance. The number of double
1First of all, multi-country activity renders MNEs’ profits taxable in more than just
one economy. Moreover, tax law itself contains bilateral components by the virtue of
the conclusion of double taxation treaties (DTTs). We admit that the taxation of labor
abroad may involve a bilateral component of personal income taxation. But there is much
less of a change in that than in the taxation of profits, and there tends to be less of a
variance in the treatment of expatriates across countries than of profits of MNEs across
host countries.
2However, some countries such as Germany apply unilateral exemption of MNEs’ profits
earned abroad from domestic taxation. Then, the primary dimension of international
taxation of MNEs’ foreign-earned profits accrues to profit taxation at the level of host
countries.
3Notice that there are exceptions from that rule. For instance, withholding tax rates are
waved for profits associated with foreign investments of MNEs headquartered in European
Union (EU) member countries in other EU countries by virtue of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive applying within the EU.
Chapter 3 – Statutory Corporate Tax Rates and DTTs 105
taxation treaties (DTTs) concluded has been rising steadily since the early
1960s up to 2,805 by the end of 2008 (UNCTAD 2009, p. 33). The first
treaties were signed primarily between developed countries, which are still
leading the list of countries in terms of the number of DTTs signed (see Sachs
and Sauvant 2009, p. xlv).
Theoretically, the impact of profit taxation on firm-level behavior is well
understood (see the next section for further details). While a large body of
empirical literature is available on the impact of taxation on MNEs at the
aggregate level (see de Mooij and Ederveen 2003, 2006; for a survey and the
next section for more details), much less seems to be known about the role of
profit taxes at the level of the individual firm (see Hogg, Mintz, and Slemrod,
1993; Grubert and Mutti, 2000; Weichenrieder and Ramb, 2005; Buettner
and Wamser, 2009; Buettner et al. 2009; Davies, Norbäck, and Tekin-Koru,
2009; Egger and Loretz, 2009; Overesch and Wamser 2009, 2010a,b; Bellak
and Leibrecht, 2010 for some exceptions).
This paper aims at delivering a panel data analysis of the impact of host-
country statutory corporate tax rates and DTTs for the outbound activity of
German MNEs. This analysis is not unprecedented (see Weichenrieder and
Ramb, 2005; Buettner and Wamser, 2009; Buettner et al. 2009; Overesch and
Wamser 2009, 2010a,b, for a few examples). However, we pursue a different
route of empirical modeling and focus on the impact of host-country statutory
tax rates and DTTs by explicitly distinguishing between the extensive versus
intensive margin of activity. In particular, we argue that – in an analysis of
bilateral MNE activity at the firm level – empirical researchers should account
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for the main set of options and alternatives of investment for MNEs. Hence,
when considering the extensive margin of investment, one should consider all
main locations where firms could have invested rather than only those where
we actually observe investment. With MNEs that typically run affiliates in
only one host country or a small number of host countries, this means that
zeros feature prominently in the data. The latter requires methods which
are suitable for an analysis of nonlinear models with an excessive amount
of zeros and a relatively small amount of positive outcome at the firm level.
The latter is what we propose in this project. In doing so, we find that host
country statutory tax rates affect both the extensive as well as the intensive
margin of investment and other outcomes. DTTs mainly affect the extensive
margin, and they exhibit a positive effect on German MNE activity abroad.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sum-
marizes insights from previous work on the impact of statutory tax rates on
corporate profits abroad and on DTTs on MNE activity. Section 3.3 provides
some information about the data on German MNEs we employ in this study
and the estimation methods applied in order to distinguish between effects
of profit taxation on the intensive and extensive margins of MNE activity.
Section 3.4 summarizes estimation results and provides a quantification of
the role of the considered corporate profit tax instruments on all margins
and outcomes of MNE activity we focus on. The last section concludes with
a summary of the most important insights.
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3.2 The Effect of Foreign Statutory Tax Rates
and Double Taxation Treaties on Multi-
national Activity
A large body of theoretical work studies the consequences of profit taxation
on firm-level behavior, especially, that of MNEs (see, e.g., Janeba, 1995,
1996, 1998; Devereux and Griffith 1998; Hines 1996; Raff and Srinivasan,
1998; Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Davies,
2003, 2004, 2005; Devereux and Hubbard 2003; Haufler and Pflüger, 2004;
Raff, 2004; Fuest and Hemmelgarn, 2005; Fuest and Becker, 2010; for recent
examples; Wilson, 1999; Gresik, 2001; and Devereux, 2008; provide excellent
surveys of associated work). Clearly, there are two main channels through
which host country statutory corporate profit tax rates affect MNEs. First,
they determine the attractiveness of a location as compared to other locations
for MNE production for that and other markets by co-determining after-
tax profits. Second, their impact might be aggravated through the double
taxation of foreign-earned profits in the parent country.
Of course, even with unilateral tax exemption as in Germany, higher statu-
tory tax rates on profits in a country reduce the incentive of foreign MNEs to
locate their subsidiaries there. The latter is a statement about the extensive
margin of investments and we would expect the probability of an investment
and the number of subsidiaries investors of a given parent country locate in
a host economy ceteris paribus to decline with an increase in the statutory
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corporate tax rate applied there. For a given number of subsidiaries in a
market, we also expect the extent of activity ceteris paribus to decline in
response to an increase in the statutory corporate tax rate of the host econ-
omy. The latter accrues to substitution of actual or recorded (e.g., through
profit shifting) activity among host countries. There is a large body of ev-
idence at the aggregate level that higher (effective or statutory) corporate
profit tax rates tend to affect MNE activity negatively (see Bénassy-Quéré,
Fontagné, and Lahrèche-Révil, 2005; Grubert and Mutti, 2004; and Egger,
Loretz, Pfaffermayr, and Winner, 2009; for a few examples). Also some of
the work on firm-level effects (see the introduction for references) points in
that direction although it seems harder to identify effects with micro data.
The impact of DTTs on MNE activity is less clear-cut, especially, if a parent
country applies tax exemption of foreign-earned profits on a unilateral basis
as Germany does (see Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr, and Winner, 2006). There
are two model conventions most DTTs are based on: the OECD and the
United Nations model conventions. The former is the one used mostly be-
tween developed countries – among which tax treaties were concluded first –
and emphasizes the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion. However, with unilateral tax exemption, double taxation of foreign-
earned profits is not an issue anyway so that the task of preventing fiscal
evasion and, otherwise, establishing transparency about the taxation of for-
eign profits are dominant aspects. The United Nations model was developed
to promote the conclusion of DTTs with developing countries by addressing
their asymmetric situation as net importers of capital, which meant a one-
sided revenue sacrifice under the OECD draft model. Both models stress
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the importance of “removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to
the development of economic relations between countries”(OECD 2008, p. 7)
and the United Nations model further points to the “desirability of promot-
ing greater inflows of foreign investment to developing countries” (United
Nations 1999, p. vi). Clearly, the spirit of both models assumes a positive
effect of the conclusion of tax treaties on FDI flows. By specifying the mode
of taxation relief and agreeing on maximum levels of withholding tax rates,
DTTs reduce uncertainty about after-tax profits and can indeed be expected
to foster foreign investment. However, other features of tax treaties such as
the exchange of information to limit transfer pricing and restrict tax eva-
sion, might rather discourage FDI. So a priori it is not clear if the effect of
DTTs on foreign investment will be positive, especially, for a parent country
which applies unilateral tax exemption. In the light of these arguments, it is
hardly surprising that empirical evidence on the role of DTTs for FDI is not
conclusive (see Davies, 2004, for a review).
3.3 Data and Estimation Method
Our goal is to shed light on the importance of host country statutory tax
rates on corporate profits as well as double taxation treaties (DTTs) on MNE
activity at the micro level. Broadly speaking, at the firm level, tax policy
instruments may have two types of effects, namely at the extensive and at
the intensive margin of investment. The former relates to entry or exit of
firms in particular host countries in response to changes in statutory tax
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rates or the conclusion of DTTs, and the latter refers to changes in the level
of activity such as the number of subsidiaries per firm (which could also be
interpreted as an extensive margin), employment, foreign direct investment
or foreign assets.
Obviously, aggregate effects of tax policy conceal possibly differential effects
at the extensive and intensive margins of investment. If we are interested
in such a distinction, we need to retreat to micro-level data analysis and
apply models which support an analysis of tax effects at both the extensive
and the intensive margins of MNE activity. We propose estimating two-part
quasi-maximum likelihood models, using panel data of MNE activity at the
firm level. The advantage of these models is that they combine a binary
part – referring to the investment versus no-investment case for a given firm,
host country, and year – with a continuous part. Moreover, such models
are less restrictive about the structure and form of the error term in the
continuous part than log-linear or sample-selection models. Finally, they
are quite easy to implement and interpret (see Egger, Larch, Staub, and
Winkelmann, 2010; for a discussion of the trade-off between two-part and
sample selection models).4
4In the health economics literature there is a long and ongoing debate on the suitability
of two-part models vs. sample selection models (for a review see Jones, 2000). The
choice of any model requires assumptions. Which set of assumptions is more restrictive
is arguable. Linear specification of outcome with a sample selection model will be prone
to bias of estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities while two-part estimation with a
nonlinear outcome equation will be unbiased with heteroskedasticity and conditionally
uncorrelated errors (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Consistent estimation in the
presence of sample selection on unobservables relies on relatively strong distributional
assumptions. If selection is due only to time-invariant characteristics of the firm (within
the sample period), then, a fixed-effects approach controls perfectly for sample selection.
We exploit the panel structure of the data and pursue a fixed-effects approach, including
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3.3.1 The MiDi Data-Set
The Deutsche Bundesbank provides firm-level data on the universe of Ger-
man multinationals and their activity abroad through the Microdatabase Di-
rect Investment (MiDi) (above the reporting threshold).5 All German firms
and households which hold 10% or more of the shares or voting rights in
a foreign enterprise with a balance sheet total of more than 3 million Euro
are required by law to report to the Deutsche Bundesbank balance sheet
information as well as information on the sector, legal form, and number of
employees of the investment object.6 Altogether, our sample comprises 6,915
firms over the period 1996 to 2005 which hold foreign affiliates in at least one
of 51 host countries (see the Appendix for a list of possible host countries).
This data-set allows us to analyze possible effects of statutory tax rates on
corporate profits abroad and of DTTs on the different margins of investment
firm-by-country as well as firm-by-time fixed effects. We prefer a much more flexible two-
part model with a nonlinear outcome equation that is robust to heteroskedasticity to a
linear sample selection model. That model allows the participation and outcome equations
to be generated by different densities and makes no distributional assumptions.
5The data-set is made available under strict conditions and for clearly defined academic
research purposes and can be used exclusively at the Research Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
6Indirect participating interests are to be reported whenever residents hold more than
50% in a foreign firm and these dependent enterprises themselves hold 10% or more of the
shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises. The reporting requirements are set
by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation. The reporting threshold was changed in
2002. Up to that year, a German firm had to report its international activities whenever
it owned 50% of shares or voting rights of a foreign company with a balance sheet total
of more than 1 million DM. As of 2002, those thresholds were changed into 10% and 3
million Euro respectively (see Lipponer, 2009). To get a uniform cutoff, we restrict the
sample to those firms with a balance sheet total of 3 million Euro and an ownership of at
least 50%. We exclude indirectly held affiliates, as they might be held through enterprises
located in a third country.
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between 1996 and 2005 at an annual basis. Also, we are able to examine
their impact on different aspects of multinational activity. In particular,
we consider possible effects on the following firm-level outcomes of German
MNEs in a host country: the total number of affiliates held, the total number
of employees, the stock of direct investment,7 and fixed assets. By using this
data-set, rather than exploiting aggregate bilateral data on MNE activity,
we should be able to gain a much better understanding of the exact channels
through which the considered profit tax instruments affect the behavior of
MNEs.
3.3.2 Determinants of MNE Activity
We model MNE activity as a function of the following regressors. First of
all, there are two tax instruments of primary interest to us: TAXj,t−1 (the
statutory tax rate on corporate profits in host country j and year t− 1) and
DTTj,t−1 (a binary variable indicating whether a DTT applies to investments
in j and year t−1).8 Otherwise, the NT ×K matrix of explanatory variables
includes the following covariates: DEPj,t−1 (the depreciation allowance on
an average investment in the host country), GDPj,t−1 (the log of real host
country GDP), KLRATj,t−1 (the log of the capital-labor ratio in the host
country), SKILLj,t−1 (the log of the tertiary school enrollment rate in the
7As calculated by the Deutsche Bundesbank according to the IMF/OECD method; see
Lipponer (2009, p.15).
8We assume that the firm outcomes in period t, such as number of affiliates held, em-
ployees, investment and fixed assets are affected by the tax instruments and economic
fundamentals, observed in the previous period, t− 1. Regressions using the contempora-
neous tax rate instead of the lagged tax rate are available upon request. The main results
remain unchanged.
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host country), STRij,t−1 (the average turnover of other firms in firm i’s sector
and host country j), SAEij,t−1 (fixed assets per employee of other firms in
firm i’s sector),9 as well as firm-year and firm-host-country fixed effects.
The choice of the control variables is motivated by the theory of MNEs and
trade which suggests, apart from (over a short time horizon as ours mostly
time-invariant) trade and investment costs, two key determinants of multi-
national activity (see Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002;
Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Davies, 2005; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007):
market size, skilled-to-unskilled labor endowments, and capital-labor-ratios.
These determine the prevalent type of multinational firms in the host coun-
try, large-market-seeking horizontal multinationals that produce the same
product at home and abroad and low-production-cost-seeking vertical ones
that produce headquarter services in skill-abundant economies and goods in
skill-scarce ones. We proxy market size with the host country’s GDP and
availability of skilled labor by tertiary school enrollment ratio. Bergstrand
and Egger (2007) point to the role of physical capital for MNEs’ plant set-
up. We include the capital-labor ratio of the host country. Our data-base
comprises starkly heterogenous firms active in numerous sectors. We lack in-
formation on sectoral gross product or capital stock at the country level for
all the year coverage, therefore, we include assets per employee and average
turnover of all other German firms in the same sector in the host country to
capture that heterogeneity.
9The variables STRij,t−1 and SAEij,t−1 were constructed taking the average turnover
and assets per employee respectively over all German MNEs except firm i in the same
sector, host country, and year.
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Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics and a definition of the variables.
The data on DTTs signed by Germany are available from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The data on statutory
taxes (TAXj,t−1) and depreciation allowances (DEPj,t−1) were collected in
Egger, Loretz, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2006). The data on real GDP,
capital-labor ratio, and tertiary school enrollment come from the 2007 edition
of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data on capital-labor
ratios were taken from Bergstrand and Egger (2007). Finally, STRij,t−1 and
SAEij,t−1 were constructed on the basis of information contained in the MiDi
data-set.
3.3.3 Specification and Estimation of Two-Part
Models
Location decisions of MNEs will be affected by time-invariant (regulatory,
geographical, institutional) as well as time-variant (economic) conditions. In
particular, we would expect profit tax instruments to change these decisions
indirectly but have a qualitatively different impact on decisions about the
extent of investment and other outcomes. We thus expect the profit tax
instruments we focus on – i.e., statutory tax rates on corporate profits and
DTTs – to affect lumpy foreign investment decisions at the extensive margin,
namely the probability of an MNE to set up an affiliate in a particular host
country, and, at the intensive margin, the extent of an MNEs’ activity there
conditional on some investment differently.
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A two-part model (TPM) allows us to disentangle these two effects by letting
the zeros and positive outcomes be generated by different densities. The first
part of the TPM is a binary outcome model and the second part describes
the distribution of the outcome conditional on the outcome being positive.
Define a binary indicator variable Iijt = 1 if a firm i holds a foreign affiliate in
host country j at time t (for pairs ij = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T ) and Iijt = 0
otherwise. Let yijt be the outcome of firm i in host country j at time t, xij,t−1
a 1×K vector of firm- and country-specific explanatory variables (including
TAXj,t−1 the statutory tax rate on corporate profits in host country j at
time t− 1, DTTj,t−1 a dummy variable indicating if there is a DTT in place
between Germany and country j at time t − 1, and the control variables),
and ®ij a time-invariant firm-host specific effect. The TPM for yijt is then
given by
f(yijt∣.) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
Pr(Iijt = 0∣xij,t−1, ®ij) if yijt = 0
Pr(Iijt = 1∣.)f(yijt∣Iijt = 1,xij,t−1, ®ij) if yijt > 0
We estimate the effect of statutory corporate tax rates DTTs on the partic-
ipation decision Iijt (the extensive margin) by specifying Pr(Iijt = 1∣.) as a
probit for whether or not a firm i holds an affiliate in country j at time t.
Iijt = 1 whenever firm i owns any affiliate in a given host country j in year
t, no matter how many or which ones. A change in the industry affiliation
of an affiliate would thus not change Iijt. However, if the extent of activities
is below the reporting thresholds, Iijt = 0. If the activity of firm i in j is
above the reporting threshold in year t− 1, below it in year t, and above it
in year t+1, this would be considered as exit in t an re-entry in t+1. Notice
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that we may not include dummy variables for fixed firm-host-country effects
since all model parameters would be biased due to the incidental parameter
problem, then. However, we may still control for fixed firm-host-country ef-
fects (and, similarly, for fixed firm-year effects) by inserting respective means
of all covariates in the corresponding dimensions, following Mundlak (1978),
Chamberlain (1982, 1984), and Wooldridge (2002).10 As indicated in the pre-
vious subsection, we include firm-year fixed effects apart from (individual)
firm-host-country fixed effects to capture exhaustively common effects in the
time and cross-sectional dimensions (note that we have therefore ruled out a
possible bias of the omission of aggregate time-variant variables for Germany
as well as the one of time-invariant effects such as distance between Germany
and host country i, etc.).
We make no distributional assumptions about the second part of the model,
f(yijt∣Iijt = 1, .), and specify it as an exponential regression model.11 The
latter copes with potential mis-specification of the error term by transforming
the model log-linearly (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, for arguments in
a different context), and obtains the effect of the tax instruments of interest
on the intensive margin yijt. Similar to the first part, we include individual
effects ®ij by specifying E(®ij∣xij) = x̄′ij¼ where x̄ij are the firm-host-country
means of the regressors (see Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1982, 1984; and
10Alternatively, one could estimate annual probit models by allowing the parameters of
the covariates to vary across the years. However, this would come at the expense of not
being able to control for firm-host-country fixed effects but only for separate firm and host
country effects.
11See Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009) for a Poisson fixed effects model using passive assets
as the dependent variable. However, in contrast to ours, their model does not represent a
two-part approach.
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Wooldridge, 2002). By convention, the same regressors are allowed to and,
in our application, do appear in both parts of the model.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
We present the results of our empirical analysis in two parts. First, we
summarize parameter estimates of covariates, in particular, of statutory tax
rates on corporate profits and DTTs, on bilateral MNE activity at the firm
level. As mentioned before, we use the number of affiliates, the number of
employees, the FDI stock, and fixed assets as alternative outcomes and ana-
lyze effects on the extensive and the intensive margin of activity separately.
Then, we discuss effects of TAXj,t−1 and DTTj,t−1 by taking the nonlinear
nature of the estimated models into account.12 Also, we quantify impact
effects of DTTj,t−1 on outcome by means of comparisons of predicted effects
and counterfactual predictions which are based on changed DTTj,t−1.
12In principal, TAXj,t−1 and DTTj,t−1 could be endogenous. However, this is very
unlikely for the following reasons. First, the unit of observation is an individual firm in
a host country and year. These units will unlikely affect aggregate government decisions.
Moreover, these variables are lagged by one year. Furthermore, we include firm-year
and firm-country fixed effects so that any endogeneity bias would have to come from the
remaining variation in the disturbances. If the selection bias of DTTj,t−1 is time-invariant,
or there is no impact of future firm activity (the dependent variables) on lagged DTTj,t−1,
the estimated parameters are free of selection bias.
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Table 3.2: Estimation results Poisson QML (whole sample)
Poisson QML
affiliates employees FDI assets
TAXj,t−1 -1.175*** -3.797*** -4.069*** -5.322***
(0.194) (0.754) (1.153) (1.549)
DTTj,t−1 0.062** 0.184* 0.253** 0.270**
(0.027) (0.104) (0.101) (0.122)
DEPj,t−1 -0.347*** -0.251 -0.288 -0.162
(0.122) (0.270) (0.498) (0.542)
GDPj,t−1 0.817*** 0.697* 1.432** 1.021
(0.119) (0.381) (0.580) (0.690)
SKILLj,t−1 0.516*** 0.920*** 0.816*** 0.992**
(0.053) (0.196) (0.286) (0.415)
KLRATj,t−1 0.059 -0.129 0.104 -0.134
(0.051) (0.137) (0.255) (0.306)
STRij,t−1 -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(1.8e-04) (5.1e-04) (6.9e-04) (9.8e-04)
SAEij,t−1 3.7e-05*** 7.7e-05*** 2.2e-05*** 1.5e-06
(4.3e-06) (2.9e-05) (8.0e-06) (5.5e-06)
Marginal Effects
TAXj,t−1 -0.035*** -20.044*** -13.883*** -13.547***
(0.006) (4.087) (3.880) (3.776)
DTTj,t−1 0.002** 0.921* 0.801*** 0.636**
(0.001) (0.491) (0.296) (0.255)
Wald 13,548 3,541 3,723 2,383
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log.L. -260,152 -46,661,315 -40,504,794 -31,801,667
Obs. 1,485,711 1,485,711 1,485,711 1,485,711
Groups 332,714 332,714 332,714 332,714
Notes: All regressions include firm-host and firm-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by
firm-host pair reported in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged once. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower third of the table reports the Wald (Â2) test
statistic for joint significance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood function, the
number of observations, and the number of groups (firm-host pairs). Marginal effects evaluated at the
sample mean.
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In Table 3.2, we report the results of a Poisson QML model using the whole
sample of firms. There, we estimate the effect of statutory tax rates and
DTTs on the conditional mean of outcome yijt, irrespective of whether the
firm actually operates an affiliate there or not. In principal, the associated
econometric model is identical to the second part of a two-part model, except
that one does not condition on positive outcome. By assumption, that model
copes with a proportionate but not an excessive amount of zero outcome in
the data.
The four columns of Table 3.2 refer to the outcomes number of affiliates,
number of employees, FDI stock, and fixed assets, respectively. After con-
trolling for the aforementioned economic fundamentals, statutory corporate
tax rates display a negative impact on any of the outcomes while DTT gen-
erally exerts a positive effect. In any case, the parameter estimates of the
two profit tax variables of interest are significantly different from zero.
The estimated semi-elasticities of host-country statutory tax rate on corpo-
rate profits range from -1.17 to -5.32, a magnitude which is comparable to
previous findings, mostly for aggregate data (see de Mooij and Ederveen,
2006, for a meta-analysis where they find a typical semi-elasticity of -2.1;
Overesch and Wamser, 2009, using the same data-set and a count-data anal-
ysis find a semi-elasticity of -2.17).13 The estimated effect of a DTT ranges
13In the Poisson model, as in any model with an exponential conditional mean
E(y∣x) = exp(x′¯), the regression coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities since
the marginal effect MEk = E(y∣x)× ¯k, so ¯k = MEk/E(y∣x). The effect of the discrete
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from 6.4% (on the expected number of affiliates) to 31% (on the expected
volume of fixed assets). The point estimates for a host country’s deprecia-
tion allowances turns out to be negative, which is counter-intuitive, but the
corresponding estimate is almost always insignificantly different from zero.
While the semi-elasticities in Table 3.2 are interesting, they are not conducive
to a quantification at first glance. Therefore, we report marginal effects of
TAXj,t−1 and DTTj,t−1 in the lower part of the table. The corresponding
effects suggest that an increase in the statutory tax rate on corporate profits
of the average host country and year t − 1 by one percentage point reduces
employment, stocks of outbound FDI, or total assets there by about 0.2 em-
ployees, 14,000 Euro of stocks of FDI, and 14,000 of assets, respectively. It
reduces the number of affiliates by about 0.0004 on average. The correspond-
ing effect of concluding a DTT where there was none before is considerably
less important.
Regarding the non-tax location determinants, we find that both a larger host
country market-size (measured by GDP) and the availability of skilled labor
have a positive significant effect on the activity of a firm in that country. The
capital-labor ratio, on the other hand, does not seem to have a significant
effect on any firm outcome, after controlling for relative endowments with
skilled relative to unskilled labor.
The results described in Table 3.2 reveal that statutory corporate tax rates
change in a binary variable such as DTT would be MEk = exp(x
′¯ + ¯k) − exp(x′¯) =
(e¯k−1)exp(x′¯) meaning a percentage change of 100×(e¯k−1) (see Cameron and Trivedi,
2005).
Chapter 3 – Statutory Corporate Tax Rates and DTTs 122
have a significant negative and tax treaties a positive and significant effect
on foreign investment in a given host country, but are not informative about
the extent to which these tax instruments affect the location decision of
firms (i.e., the extensive margin of MNE activity) or the outcomes of firms
conditional on location in a host country (i.e., the intensive margin of MNE
activity). To shed light on this matter, we turn to the results of the two-part
model in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.3 reports the probit estimates of the
effect of the tax variables of interest on the probability of a firm to set up an
affiliate in a host country (the extensive margin), and Table 3.4 shows their
effect on the extent of a positive outcome (the intensive margin) by means of
a Poisson QML regression, i.e., conditional on the firm to having set up an
affiliate in host country j in year t or before that. All dependent variables are
once-lagged and all regressions include firm-host and firm-year fixed effects.
The probit estimates in Table 3.3 suggest that the statutory tax rate of the
host country deters lumpy foreign investment there. On the other hand,
the conclusion of a DTT has indeed a positive and significant effect on the
probability of a firm to set up an affiliate in the host country. All of that is
in line with our expectations from a theoretical point of view. There is no
significant (indirect) effect of depreciation allowances in the host country on
investment there.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the Poisson QML model which – unlike in
Table 3.2 – is run on the subsample observations with a positive outcome
yijt. As said before, the corresponding parameter estimates reflect the effect
of the tax variables of interest and the other covariates on firm outcomes
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Table 3.3: Estimation results of two-part models I
Probit
TAXj,t−1 -0.627***
(0.085)
DTTj,t−1 0.025**
(0.010)
DEPj,t−1 -0.070
(0.047)
GDPj,t−1 0.425***
(0.052)
SKILLj,t−1 0.239***
(0.020)
KLRATj,t−1 -0.013
(0.022)
STRij,t−1 -0.001***
(1.67e-04)
SAEij,t−1 1.7e-05***
(2.6e-06)
Marginal Effects
TAXj,t−1 -0.039***
(0.005)
DTTj,t−1 0.002**
(0.001)
Wald 11,288
p-value 0.000
Log.L. -235,100
Obs. 1,485,711
Groups 332,714
Notes: All regressions include firm-host and firm-year fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors clustered by firm-host pair reported
in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged once. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The lower third of the table reports the Wald (Â2) test statistic
for joint significance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of
the log-likelihood function, the number of observations, and the
number of groups (firm-host pairs). Marginal effects evaluated at
the sample mean.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of two-part models II
Poisson QML
affiliates employees FDI assets
TAXj,t−1 0.069 -1.526** -2.277** -3.221**
(0.075) (0.615) (1.005) (1.424)
DTTj,t−1 -0.003 0.077 0.130 0.149*
(0.011) (0.070) (0.080) (0.089)
DEPj,t−1 -0.173* 0.075 0.575 0.372
(0.095) (0.401) (0.770) (0.823)
GDPj,t−1 -0.024 -0.552 1.065 -0.132
(0.079) (0.500) (0.778) (0.978)
SKILLj,t−1 -0.028 0.352* 0.130 0.339
(0.026) (0.196) (0.288) (0.429)
KLRATj,t−1 0.073** -0.046 0.019 0.035
(0.031) (0.156) (0.294) (0.344)
STRij,t−1 -4.1e-04*** -3.2e-03*** -3.6e-03*** -4.3e-03**
(1.5e-04) (1.0e-03) (1.2e-03) (1.8e-03)
SAEij,t−1 -2.3e-06** 4.0e-05* -1.5e-05*** -2.5e-05***
(1.2e-06) (2.1e-05) (3.8e-06) (3.8e-06)
Marginal Effects
TAXj,t−1 0.075 -251.885* -322.999* -301.849*
(0.081) (103.750) (142.210) (132.940)
DTTj,t−1 -0.003 12.417 17.610* 13.180*
(0.012) (11.030) (10.370) (7.535)
Wald 158 769 626 554
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log.L. -68,259 -13,435,736 -14,432,744 -13,588,531
Obs. 63,496 63,496 63,496 63,496
Groups 14,940 14,940 14,940 14,940
Notes: All regressions include firm-host and firm-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by
firm-host pair reported in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged once. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The lower third of the table reports the Wald (Â2) test
statistic for joint significance of the regressors and its p-value, the value of the log-likelihood function, the
number of observations, and the number of groups (firm-host pairs). Marginal effects evaluated at the
sample mean.
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conditional on them being positive (i.e., conditional on the firm running at
least one affiliate in host country j and year t). As in Table 3.2, we find
a negative effect of statutory tax rates on the level of firm activity which
is statistically significantly different from zero after conditioning on positive
investment. The semi-elasticities for the parameter of TAXj,t−1 lie in the
same range as those reported in Table 3.2. However, we do not generally
find a significant effect of DTTs on outcome any more. Only when using
the volume of fixed assets as outcome is the parameter estimate of DTTj,t−1
positive and significantly different from zero at conventional levels. Hence,
it seems that DTTs affect the outbound activity of German MNEs mainly
through their effect on the extensive margin of investment.
As in Table 3.2, we report not only semi-elasticities but also marginal effects
of TAXj,t−1 and DTTj,t−1 in Tables 3 and 4. Except for the intensive margin
of the number of foreign affiliates in Table 3.4, the sign of the semi-elasticities
as well as the marginal effects is the same in Tables 3 and 4 as in Table 3.2.
However, the marginal effects of the two tax instruments are much larger
in absolute value than they were in Table 3.2. The reason for the latter is
that the semi-elasticities are not much different between Tables 3.2 and 3.4,
but we condition on positive outcome in Table 3.4. Notice that the positive
marginal effect of DTTj,t−1 is significantly different from zero for FDI stocks
as an outcome even though the semi-elasticity is not. The latter has to do
with the non-linearity of the model.
In Table 3.5, we summarize further insights for a counterfactual change from
no DTT to a DTT if there was any. Again, we summarize the results by
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Table 3.5: Counterfactual effects of DTTs
Poisson QML (whole sample)
affiliates employees FDI assets
Predicted E(yijt∣.) 0.047 7.809 6.715 4.545
Counterfactual
E(yijt∣., DTTj,t−1 = 0) 0.044 6.679 5.362 3.574
E(yijt∣., DTTj,t−1 = 1) 0.047 8.029 6.902 4.681
%-change 6.3% 20.2% 28.7% 31%
Probit
Predicted Pr(Iijt = 1∣.) 0.043
Counterfactual
Pr(Iijt = 1∣., DTTj,t−1 = 0) 0.041
Pr(Iijt = 1∣., DTTj,t−1 = 1) 0.043
%-change 5.13%
Poisson QML conditional on positive investment
affiliates employees FDI assets
Predicted E(yijt∣., Iijt = 1) 1.094 182.727 157.121 106.338
Counterfactual
E(yijt∣., Iijt = 1, DTTj,t−1 = 0) 1.097 171.001 139.767 93.064
E(yijt∣., Iijt = 1, DTTj,t−1 = 1) 1.094 184.781 159.245 107.998
%-change 13.93% 16.04%
Notes: % change reported only for outcomes where the estimated effect of DTT is significant at the 15%
level.
computing averages across all cross-sectional units and years. We do so for
all models we report results for in Tables 2, 3 and 4. For each model, we
report first the mean of the predicted outcome based on observed data and
DTTj,t−1. Moreover, we report the mean of the prediction after setting all
DTTs first to zero, and then to one. We also report the corresponding %-
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change for all outcomes where the estimated effect of DTT was significantly
different at 15 percent. At the top of Table 3.5 we report the effect of DTTs
on the mean of the predictions for the model where we do not condition on
positive outcome. The effect ranges from 6.3% (on the expected number of
affiliates) to 31% (on the expected volume of fixed assets). Below, we see how
DTTs affect the extensive and intensive margins separately. The predicted
probability of setting up an affiliate is 5.13% higher after setting all DTTs
to one. Conditioning on positive outcome, the effect of a change of DTTj,t−1
from zero to one on the expected stock of FDI and volume of fixed assets is
13.93% and 16.04% respectively.
All effects reported in Table 3.5 are average effects. The non-linearity of the
models implies that the effect of DTTj,t−1 depends on the value of the regres-
sors. It is therefore interesting to evaluate the effect of DTTs and statutory
tax rates together. In Figures 3.1 to 3.3 we show the effect of DTTj,t−1 on
the whole distribution of TAXj,t−1. We plot the effect of TAXj,t−1 on the
predicted outcome for the two values of DTTj,t−1. The difference between
the two curves is the marginal effect of DTTj,t−1.
Figure 3.1 plots the predicted probability of a firm setting up an affiliate in
a host country as a function of the host country statutory tax rate. The
marginal effect of DTTj,t−1 (the difference between the two curves) decreases
with the statutory tax rate. The probability that a firm will set up an affiliate
in a host country after the conclusion of a DTT is greater for countries with
lower statutory tax rates. In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 we repeat the exercise for
the conditional mean of FDI stock and volume of fixed assets respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Effect of statutory tax rates and DTT on the predicted proba-
bility of setting up an affiliate
Again, the increase in the expected outcome associated with a change in
DTTj,t−1 is larger for countries with lower statutory tax rates. In Figure 3.3,
the marginal effect ofDTTj,t−1 on the expected average volume of fixed assets
of a firm in a host country ranges from about 0.7 mn Euro at a statutory tax
rate of 0.53 to 2.8 mn at a tax rate of 0.10%.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of statutory tax rates and DTT on the conditional mean
of FDI
3.5 Conclusions
This paper proposes estimating two-part empirical models for an assessment
of the impact of profit tax policy instruments on outcome measuring bilateral
multinational activity at the firm level. At the bilateral level, outcome of the
activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is characterized by numerous ze-
ros in the data, since MNEs tend to set up affiliates in only a small number
of countries. From an empirical point of view this generates data on bilateral
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Figure 3.3: Effect of statutory tax rates and DTT on the conditional mean
of assets
firm-level MNE activity with numerous zeros and a much smaller number of
positive outcome about numbers of affiliates, employment abroad, stocks of
FDI, or total assets abroad per host country. Accordingly, it is impossible
for simple nonlinear models such as non-linear least squares or the Poisson
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Poisson QMLE) to cope with the nu-
merous zeros in the data appropriately. However, the empirical economist
can improve tremendously on empirical model performance by resorting to
a two-part modeling strategy, where one part is binary and about the ex-
tensive margin (zero versus positive outcome per firm and host country) and
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the other part is continuous and about the intensive margin. The latter can
be estimated by ordinary least squares, nonlinear least squares, or Poisson
QMLE. An advantage of the Poisson QMLE is that it is robust against mis-
specification of the error term if a log-transformation of the model is not
appropriate (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
We apply Poisson QMLE with a two-part modeling strategy to firm-level
data about the activity of German MNEs abroad. In particular, we focus on
the the role of statutory corporate tax rates abroad and of double taxation
treaties (DTTs) signed by Germany on the number of affiliates, total employ-
ment, stocks of foreign direct investment, and total assets in the host country.
We employ panel data with annual frequency for the decade between 1996
and 2005 as made available by the Deutsche Bundesbank through its MiDi
database.
We find that higher statutory tax rates in a potential host country reduce
the probability of setting up the first affiliate by a German MNE there signif-
icantly. The latter relates to the extensive margin of investment by German
MNEs. Also, higher statutory tax rates reduce the activity at the intensive
margin, i.e., they tend to reduce the number of affiliates (beyond the first
one), the number of employees, the value of FDI stocks, and the value of
foreign assets. DTTs tend to raise the incentive of a first investment and,
if having any effect at the intensive margin, they raise outbound FDI and
foreign assets. However, the role of DTTs in absolute value is much smaller
than the one of foreign statutory tax rates.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the tax responsiveness of multinationals’ investment
decisions in foreign countries, distinguishing firms that are able to shift prof-
its (shifters) from those that are not (non-shifters). From a theoretical point
of view, the tax responsiveness of firms crucially depends on this distinction.
Empirically, however, a firm’s ability to shift profits is inherently unobserved.
To address this problem, we use a finite mixture modeling approach which al-
lows us to distinguish shifters from non-shifters stochastically from a mixture
of distributions of the two types of firms. Using a panel data-set of 38,705
foreign affiliates of the universe of German multinationals over the years 1996
to 2007, we find that shifters do not respond to host-country profit taxes at
all, as expected, while taxes affect the investment decision of non-shifters.
More specifically, a one-percentage-point increase in the statutory corporate
profit tax rate of a host country is associated with a reduction of the fixed
assets of non-shifters in the host country by 1.85%.
4.1 Introduction
A vast amount of empirical research on the profit-tax responsiveness of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) suggests a robust negative impact of profit
taxation on the location and size of foreign investments. In a meta-analysis
on the matter, De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find that the median semi-
elasticity amounts to −3.3. Hence, a one-percentage-point increase in a host
country’s (corporate) profit tax rate triggers, ceteris paribus, a decline of
(bilateral) FDI by about 3.3% there.1 However, the same study by De Mooij
1A more recent study of De Mooij and Ederveen (2006) finds a somewhat smaller
median semi-elasticity of −2.1. Hines (1999) suggests an average profit tax elasticity of
FDI of about −0.60.
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and Ederveen (2003) also documents a big variance of the estimated profit
tax elasticities of FDI across studies. Common explanations for the latter
are the differences in the applied empirical specifications and the data used.
Yet differences in tax elasticities may also be rationalized by the specific
responses of heterogeneous firms.
Differences in the characteristics of multinational firms – such as their geo-
graphical affiliate pattern, their financial flexibility, their specialization pat-
tern, firm size, etc. – may not only explain why some firms enter a specific
market. Such characteristics crucially determine whether and to what extent
a multinational can reduce its overall tax burden by shifting profits from high-
tax to low-tax countries and, hence, a firm’s responsiveness to profit taxes. In
a recent paper, Egger, Eggert, and Winner (2010) investigate whether foreign
plant ownership involves lower tax payments than domestic plant ownership.
They find that tax payments of foreign-owned firms are lower than those of
domestic firms in high-tax countries but higher in low-tax countries, which is
consistent with the presumption that multinationals shift income. Of course,
national firms are not able to shift income to other countries at all, but nei-
ther are all multinational firms necessarily capable of shifting profits to an
arbitrary extent.
Which multinationals are able to shift profits, rendering them fairly insensi-
tive to profit taxation? How big is their fraction in all firms? By how much
differ shifters and non-shifters of profits in their tax responsiveness? Those
appear to be questions of vital interest to economists and policy makers for
the following reasons. First, with a coexistence of shifting multinationals (i.e.
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unresponsive to taxes) and non-shifting multinationals (i.e. highly respon-
sive to taxes), knowledge of an average rate of response of aggregate FDI is
not informative about important margins at the firm level. In particular, it
conceals effects on the distribution of the two types of firms. Second, to the
extent that possible shifters and non-shifters differ with regard to economic
characteristics such as average employment or their location within coun-
tries, knowledge of heterogeneous responses of these types of firms may allow
us to draw conclusions for the responsiveness of specific economic (regional)
aggregates to tax policy changes.
This paper sheds light on the impact of taxes on the investment decision
of foreign affiliates of the universe of German multinationals by allowing
for distinct responses of inherently unobserved shifters and non-shifters of
profits. The logic is straightforward: a firm which is capable of shifting at
least part of its tax base should be less affected by (i.e., less responsive to)
changes in profit taxes with regard to its foreign investment decisions than
others. By the same token, non-shifters should face higher costs of capital
and, in turn, lower levels of investment in high-profit-tax host countries than
shifters of profits. These arguments are consistent with theoretical work em-
phasizing that restrictions on the opportunities for tax planning may result
in adverse consequences for multinationals’ investment in high-tax countries,
which subsequently may reinforce tax competition (see, for example, Keen,
2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Peralta, Wauthy, van Ypersele, 2006; Bucov-
etsky and Haufler, 2008; Haufler and Runkel, 2008).
The major challenge in analyzing empirically the different tax responsiveness
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of shifters and non-shifters is that profit shifting of multinational firms itself
is inherently unobservable. We approach this issue by using a finite mixture
model to estimate the different tax responsiveness of latent profit shifters
and non-shifters. Finite mixture models are a semiparametric approach to
modeling unobserved heterogeneity. The population of interest – in our case,
all investments of the universe of German multinational firms – is assumed to
be composed of a finite number of distinct but unidentified latent classes or
population components – here, profit shifters and non-shifters. The density
of all units (investments) is modeled as an additive mixture of the subpop-
ulations. Any randomly drawn observation has a given a priori probability
of belonging to one of the groups – shifters and non-shifters of profits. The
unknown prior probability of belonging to either one of the classes is esti-
mated along with the other parameters. That prior probability is assumed
either constant and equal to the proportion of firms in that group, or it is
parameterized and modeled as a function of observables which vary across
observations.
Finite mixture models have been introduced in the econometrics literature
by Heckman and Singer (1984) and have recently gained popularity in the
health economics literature, where most studies use cross-sectional data (see
Deb and Trivedi, 1997, 2002; Smith Conway, and Deb, 2005; Ayyagari, Deb,
Fletcher, Gallo, and Sindelar, 2009a,b). Finite mixture models have been
applied to panel data by Bago d’Uva (2005, 2006) or Deb and Trivedi (2011).
In this paper we fit finite mixture models to a panel of foreign affiliates
of German multinational firms, and account for affiliate-specific unobserved
effects by modeling the conditional mean of the unobserved effects following
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the approach of Mundlak (1978) as popularized by Chamberlain (1984) and
Wooldrige (2002).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate whether
and to which extent the investment decisions of multinational firms in host
countries depend on their unobserved ability to shift profits or not. We iden-
tify two groups of firms which differ in their average investment levels and
react differently to corporate profit taxation. The larger group of firms, asso-
ciated with a lower average investment, is not able to shift profits and reacts
negatively to corporate tax rates. The estimated tax semi-elasticity of these
firms ranges from -1.85 to -2.32, magnitudes in line with previous findings.
However, there is a smaller group of firms, which is characterized by a higher
average investment, that displays no significant response to corporate taxes.
In our preferred specification, a one-percentage-point increase in the statu-
tory profit tax rate is associated with a 1.85% lower stock of fixed assets of
a non-shifting foreign affiliate. This effect amounts to 68,000 Euro for the
average affiliate of that kind with an average investment of 3.65 million Euro
in fixed assets. The average shifting affiliate has a much higher investment
in fixed assets of about 155 million Euro. If such an affiliate were prevented
from shifting profits and were to respond to corporate tax rates in the same
way as the average non-shifting affiliate, the estimated semi-elasticity would
imply an effect of 2.88 million Euro of fixed assets per percentage point tax
increase.
The findings carry implications for tax policy. The consequences for a given
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country of introducing measures to prevent profit shifting will depend on
the composition of affiliates investing in that country. To the extent that
a considerable proportion of a country’s foreign investments are carried out
by firms that shift profits, the adoption of a policy to restrict profit-shifting
opportunities would expose them to tax competition with other countries over
the shifting firms’ investments. The country would have to lower corporate
profit tax rates significantly in order to prevent a significant relocation of
plants and capital of investment projects from its jurisdiction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
empirical literature on profit taxation and multinational firms. Section 4.3
presents a very simple model, briefly demonstrating that the tax elasticity of
capital depends on the extent to which a firm is able to shift income. Section
4.4.1 describes the econometric model applied. Section 4.4.2 presents the
data we use for the empirical investigation. The results are discussed in
Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 State of the Literature – Empirical Re-
search on Profit Taxes and Multinational
Firms
Our study is related to the empirical literature on the consequences of profit
taxation on multinational firm behavior, which is basically organized along
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three lines of interest. First, some work focuses on the role of profit taxes
for the location decision of firms’ lumpy investments (for example, Devereux
and Griffith, 1998; Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Büttner and Ruf, 2007; Bar-
rios, Huizinga, Laeven, Nicodème, 2008; Becker, Egger and Merlo, 2009). A
second line of research is concerned with the question of how taxes affect a
firm’s level of foreign investment or assets held abroad (for a review and meta-
studies of empirical work see De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2006, 2008). A
third line of work is interested in the extent of tax avoidance through profit
shifting, debt shifting, or transfer pricing (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines
and Rice, 1994; Swenson, 2001; Clausing, 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008;
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème, 2008; Buettner and Wamser, 2009; We-
ichenrieder, 2009; Egger, Eggert, Winner, 2010; Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg,
Winner, 2010). While Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994),
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and Weichenrieder (2009) focus on the alloca-
tion of profits, other work investigates specific strategies that are used to shift
income to low-tax countries. For instance, Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème
(2008) and Büttner and Wamser (2009) examine how tax-rate differentials
affect the use of debt. Swenson (2001) and Clausing (2003) investigate how
firms manipulate internal transfer prices to reduce taxation.
Other studies analyze how investment decisions of firms are affected by tax-
planning strategies. Hines (1996) investigates foreign investment in the U.S.
distinguishing between investors from countries that exempt foreign income
and investors from countries that grant foreign tax credits. He shows that
investors operating under tax-credit systems exhibit a lower tax sensitivity
than investors from countries with tax-exemption regimes. Overesch (2009)
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draws indirect conclusions from country characteristics that might determine
the opportunities to shift profits. In particular, investment in a host country
may depend on the tax rate at the location of the direct owner and, hence,
given that firms shift profits, the cost of capital in the host country may
increase in the tax rate at the direct owner’s location. Overesch and Wamser
(2009) show that the profit tax responses of multinational firms depend on
firm characteristics, which may be related to profit-shifting opportunities.
The studies just mentioned suggest that tax bases may be unbundled from
real economic activity, at least to some extent. This has major implications
for decisions of multinational firms. For instance, profit taxes have a limited
relevance for location and investment decisions. In particular, the ability to
shift profits should reduce the profit-tax responsiveness of firms’ investments.
However, although some observed characteristics of multinational firms facil-
itate tax-planning activities, for the most part, whether and to what extent
firms shift profits is unobserved. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to investigate how the investment decisions of multinational firms
in host countries depend on their unobserved ability to shift profits.
4.3 Profit Shifting and the Tax Responsive-
ness of Capital
To see how firms’ investments may differ with respect to their tax elasticities,
consider a very simple model of foreign investment of a multinational firm.
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The multinational maximizes profits Π of a foreign subsidiary i. To keep the
analysis simple, let us assume that capital Ki is the only factor of production.
Output is determined by the production function F (Ki), which has standard
properties such as F ′(Ki) > 0 and F ′′(Ki) < 0. We further denote the cost
of capital by ri. The profit function is then defined as
Πi = F (Ki)− ¿F (Ki)(1− Ái)− riKi, (4.1)
where ¿ denotes the local tax rate. The tax base (profit) is determined by
production F (Ki). Without any profit shifting, total tax payments amount to
¿F (Ki). The parameter Ái, 0 ≤ Ái ≤ 1, captures the degree of profit shifting
(by using transfer pricing, debt shifting, or royalty payment strategies). If
Ái = 1, the firm is able to shift all profits and effectively pays no taxes, i.e.,
¿F (Ki) − ¿ÁiF (Ki) = 0. The case without profit shifting is described by
Ái = 0. Differentiating this simple problem with respect to Ki yields
F ′(K) =
ri
1− ¿(1− Á) . (4.2)
Given the usual properties of F (Ki), this directly implies that non-shifters
with Ái = 0 require a higher marginal product of capital than shifters. In
contrast, in the extreme case with Ái = 1, the marginal decision does no
longer depend on ¿ . In view of this, the tax elasticity of Ki can then be
written as
dKi
d¿
=
(1− Á)F ′(Ki)
F ′′(Ki)[1− ¿(1− Á)] < 0. (4.3)
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Assuming that a firm is able to reduce its tax base to zero by shifting all
profits, equation (4.3) implies that the tax elasticity of Ki is zero, i.e., the
subsidiary will not respond to changes in ¿ . For all positive values of Ái < 1,
the tax response of a firm is smaller (less negative) compared with the case
of no profit shifting with Ái = 0.
4.4 Empirical Approach
4.4.1 A Finite Mixture Model
We are interested in the tax elasticity of the fixed assets of foreign affiliates
of German multinational firms. We expect tax responses of foreign affiliates
that are able to shift taxable income between different locations (shifters)
to differ from those of affiliates which can not shift profits (non-shifters).
In particular, non-shifters are expected to be affected by corporate profit
taxation, and thus have higher costs of capital and lower levels of fixed assets
than shifters at positive tax rates. However, whether an affiliate shifts profits
or not is unobserved. One way to approach this problem empirically is in
terms of a latent class analysis: the population of affiliates is considered to
be composed of two underlying latent classes or population components (see
Aitkin and Rubin, 1985). We use a finite mixture model to estimate the
different tax responsiveness of two latent classes of affiliates, profit shifters
(s) and non-shifters (ns). In this model, the whole sample of affiliates is seen
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as a probabilistic mixture from two subpopulations with different densities.2
Let yit denote the stock of fixed assets of affiliate i = 1, . . . , N in period
t = 1, . . . , T . The outcome yit is characterized by one of two different densities
f ℓ, ℓ = {s, ns}, with the same distributional form but different parameters µℓ,
depending on whether affiliate i is able to shift profits in period t or not. Let
xit be a 1×K vector of affiliate- and country-specific explanatory variables,
and ci a time-invariant affiliate-specific effect. The following density defines
a two-component finite mixture
f(yit∣xit,µs,µns, ci, ¼ns) = ¼nsfns(yit∣xit,µns, ci)
+ (1− ¼ns)f s(yit∣xit,µs, ci), (4.4)
where 0 ≤ ¼ns ≤ 1. ¼ns is the fraction of affiliates that can not shift profits
in period t. Their outcome yit is characterized by f
ns(yit∣xit,µns, ci). The
fraction ¼s = (1−¼ns) of affiliates is able to shift profits and is characterized
by the density f s(yit∣xit,µs, ci).
While the fraction ¼ns is unknown, it can be estimated along with the param-
eters we are interested in, µℓ. In principle, we could treat the probability ¼ns
of belonging to the group of non-shifting affiliates as an unknown constant.
But since we observe characteristics of the affiliates which have an influence
on that probability, we may parameterize ¼ns by using, e.g., a logistic func-
2The densities differ in their moments but have the same distributional form.
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tion and allow it to depend on observable characteristics. For this, let us
write
¼ns =
exp(z′it±)
[1 + exp(z′it±)]
, (4.5)
where zit is a 1 × Q vector of observed characteristics that determine the
probability of profit shifting.
We specify an exponential conditional mean model for an affiliate’s fixed
assets yit, where the unobserved time-invariant affiliate-specific effect ci en-
ters multiplicatively, so that E(yit∣xi1, . . . , xiT , ci) = ciexp(x′it¯ℓ). We fol-
low the approach introduced by Mundlak (1978) and popularized by Cham-
berlain (1984) and Wooldridge (2002), and allow ci to be correlated with
the individual-specific averages of the regressors across all periods, x̄i =
T−1
∑T
t=1 xit. In particular, we specify E(ci∣xi1, . . . , xiT ) = exp(°ℓ + x̄′i»ℓ),
which implies the conditional mean
E(yit∣xi1, . . . , xiT ) = exp(°ℓ + x′it¯ℓ + x̄′i»ℓ) (4.6)
by iterated expectations.3
Furthermore, we specify the density f ℓ(yit∣µℓ) as a negative binomial with
3By the law of iterated expectations,
E(yit∣xi1, . . . , xiT ) = E[E(yit∣xi1, . . . , xiT , ci)∣xi1, . . . , xiT ]
= E[ciexp(x
′
it¯
ℓ)∣xi1, . . . , xiT ]
= E(ci∣xi1, . . . , xiT )exp(x′it¯ℓ)
= exp(°ℓ + x′it¯
ℓ + x̄′i»
ℓ).
See Wooldridge (2002, chapter 19).
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parameters ¹ℓit = exp(x
′
it¯
ℓ) and ®ℓ, where µℓ = (¯ℓ, ®ℓ), ℓ = {s, ns}.4
Alternatively, we fit a model to the logarithm of fixed assets ln(yit) and
specify f ℓ(yit∣µℓ) as a normal distribution. The estimation is performed by
maximum likelihood.
The posterior probability that observation yit belongs to the group of non-
shifters is given by
Pr(yit ∈ ns) = ¼
nsfns(yit∣xit,µns, ci)
¼nsfns(yit∣xit,µns, ci) + (1− ¼ns)f s(yit∣xit,µs, ci) . (4.7)
Equation 4.7 allows us to classify observations into the groups after estimat-
ing the model.
4.4.2 Data and Specification
We use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by Deutsche
Bundesbank (the German Central Bank; see Lipponer, 2009, for a docu-
4The negative binomial distribution is obtained by assuming that the dependent vari-
able yit follows a Poisson distribution with parameter ¸it, and letting ¸it = ¹itºit. ¹it
is in our case exp(x′it¯) and ºit is a gamma-distributed random unobserved component
with parameter m = 1/®. The marginal distribution of yit conditional on the determin-
istic parameters ¹it and ® is obtained by integrating ºit out, which gives f(yit∣¹it, ®) =∫
ℎ(yit∣¹it, ®)g(ºit∣®)dº = Γ(®
−1+yit)
Γ(®−1)Γ(yit+1)
( ®
−1
®−1+¹it
)®
−1
( ¹it¹it+®−1 )
y
it. Letting ® be a parame-
ter to be estimated obtains the conditional variance V [yit∣¹it, ®] = ¹it(1 + ®¹it), which is
quadratic in the mean allowing for overdispersion in the data. This version of the model
is called negative binomial 2 (NB2). See Cameron and Trivedi (2006) for details. By
choosing a negative binomial model, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity within each
subpopulation (or latent class).
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mentation).5 This data-set contains annual statistics on virtually all foreign
affiliates of German multinationals. All German investors holding 10% or
more of shares or voting rights in foreign firms with a balance sheet total
of more than 3 million Euro are required by law to report to the Deutsche
Bundesbank balance-sheet information as well as information on the sector,
legal form, and number of employees of their foreign affiliates. Indirect par-
ticipating interests are to be reported whenever residents hold more than
50% in a foreign firm and these dependent enterprises themselves hold 50%
or more of the shares or voting rights in other foreign enterprises.6
Our sample comprises 38,705 foreign affiliates of 9,803 German multinational
firms investing in 85 countries over the period 1996 to 2007. Altogether,
we have 191,116 observations on the stock of fixed assets of these foreign
affiliates.
We are predominantly interested in the effect of the statutory corporate in-
come tax rate of a host country j in year t, CITRjt, on the fixed assets of
foreign affiliates. As alternative tax measures, we use the effective average
tax rate, EATRjt, and the effective marginal tax rate, EMTRjt. The first
one measures the tax effect on the after-tax net present value of investments,
and the latter reflects the tax burden on the cost of capital, i.e., the returns
on a marginal investment. These two measures consider all rules determining
5The data-set is made available only under strict conditions and for clearly defined
academic research purposes and can be used exclusively at the Bank’s Research Center.
6The reporting requirements are set by the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation.
Reporting thresholds have been changed in the past, for details and a documentation on
the micro-level data-set MiDi see Lipponer (2009).
Chapter 4 – Unobserved Profit Shifting 154
the tax base (such as depreciation allowances). Previous work suggests that
while the relevant tax measure determining the size of an investment – condi-
tional on the location choice – is the effective marginal tax rate, the effective
average tax rate is what determines discrete (lumpy) investment decisions
and location choice (Devereux and Griffith, 1998, 2003). However, these two
alternative tax measures are available only for a subset of the countries in
the sample, leading to a loss of almost 40,000 observations. For this reason
we include CITRjt in our preferred specification.
7 In any case, we expect a
higher tax rate to raise the cost of capital and affect investment in fixed assets
negatively to the extent that a foreign affiliate is unable to avoid taxation by
shifting profits.
The theory of multinational firms and trade suggests that multinational firm
activity depends mainly on market size, skilled labor endowments, capital-
labor ratios, factor prices, and trade and investment costs (see Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonin-
gen, Davies, and Head, 2003; and Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Blonigen and
Piger, 2010). This motivates the choice of the remaining variables included
in the vector xit. To capture market size, we include GDPjt, the log of real
GDP. The tertiary school enrolment rate, SKILLjt, and the log capital-labor
ratio, KLRATjt, reflect relative factor endowments. The log of real GDP per
capita, GDPPCjt, is a proxy for labor costs; the local lending interest rate,
7Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Overesch and Wamser (2009, 2010) show that the statu-
tory corporate income tax rate is an appropriate alternative to the effective average tax
rate. Devereux and Griffith (2003) point out that the effective average tax rate is a
weighted average of the effective marginal tax rate and the statutory tax rate, and it
converges to the latter as profits rise.
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LENDjt, and inflation rate, INFLjt, reflect capital costs. We also include
a corruption perception index, CPIjt, and a measure of banking efficiency,
FINFRjt, to control for investment costs. Trade costs are usually assumed
to be fixed over a short time span as ours and are captured in our application
(along with every other time-invariant factor) by the affiliate-specific fixed
effect ci.
The vector zit includes determinants of the probability of shifting profits. In
our case, these are the number of affiliated enterprises in other countries,
NSISit, and a variable capturing the affiliate-specific tax incentive to shift
profits defined as the average tax rate over all countries with a lower tax
rate in which the affiliate has other affiliated enterprises, PSIit.
8 A larger
number of affiliated enterprises abroad should facilitate profit shifting, so
we expect NSISit to increase the probability of shifting profits. We expect
PSIit to have a negative effect on the propensity to shift profits, since a
higher average tax rate in other locations of the multinational firm lowers the
incentive of that specific affiliate to shift profits. As robustness checks, we use
alternative specifications for the probability of shifting profits. We include
following variables alternatively: IDRit, the ratio of internal borrowing over
capital, OSit, the ownership share of the German parent, and R&Dit, a
8To be specific, the tax incentive of any affiliate i of multinational firm k in country j
in year t arises from the tax rates at other locations including the parent country and is
defined as
PSIit =
{ ∑M
m=1 ¿mt, if ¿jt > ¿mt, m ∕=j ,
¿jt otherwise.
M is the number of countries other than j in which multinational firm k holds affiliates
(including Germany, the parent country), ¿mt is the corporate tax rate in each of these
countries.
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dummy indicating if the affiliate operates in the R&D sector. We expect
a higher internal-debt-to-capital ratio (IDRit) to be an indicator of profit
shifting through debt shifting (see, e.g. Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004a).
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004b) point out that while partial ownership is
associated with coordination costs, whole ownership facilitates worldwide
tax planning. Grubert (2003) argues that R&D intensive affiliates have more
opportunities to shift profits because they engage in a greater amount of
intra-firm transactions.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Description Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variable
FixedAssetsit Foreign affiliate’s fixed assets 19.360 261.407
in million Euro
Independent Variables explaining Fixed Assets
CITRjt Statutory corporate income tax rate 0.325 0.071
EATRjt Effective average tax rate 0.295 0.065
EMTRjt Effective marginal tax rate 0.230 0.079
GDPjt log(real GDP) 27.505 1.380
KLRATjt log(capital-labor ratio) 10.574 0.926
SKILLjt Tertiary school enrollment rate 53.547 17.912
GDPPCjt log(real GDP per capita) 9.576 0.991
LENDjt Lending interest rate 8.627 9.875
INFLjt Inflation rate 3.186 5.120
CPIjt Corruption perception index 6.588 2.004
(0: totally corrupt – 10: corruption free)
FINFRjt Financial freedom index 69.371 18.378
(0: repressive – 100: negligible government influence)
Independent Variables explaining ¼ns
NSISit Number of affiliated enterprises 26.916 56.643
in other countries
PSIit Profit-shifting incentive 0.276 0.063
IDRit Internal-debt-to-capital ratio 0.180 0.248
OSit Ownership share of German parent 0.901 0.204
R&Dit 1 if affiliate operates in the 0.003 0.055
R&D sector, 0 otherwise
Observations 191,116
Notes: Panel of 191,116 observations on 38,705 foreign affiliates in 85 countries over the period
1996-2007. The variables EATR and EMTR are available for 152,660 observations.
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Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. All tax data is col-
lected from databases provided by the International Bureau of Fiscal Doc-
umentation (IBFD) and tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and
KPMG. The data on real GDP, capital-labor ratios, 9 tertiary school en-
rollment and lending interest rate come from the 2009 edition of the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. The corruption perception index is
published annually by Transparency International and ranks countries from
10 (corruption free) to 0 (almost totally corrupt) according to perceived lev-
els of corruption determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The
inflation rate is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook. The finan-
cial freedom indicator is published annually by the Heritage Foundation and
measures banking efficiency as well as independence from government control
and interference in the financial sector, ranking economies from 100 (negli-
gible government influence) to 0 (repressive). The variables NSISit, PSIit,
IDRit, OSit, and R&Dit are constructed upon information taken from MiDi.
4.5 Results
We provide results of two-component negative binomial mixture models for
the effects of corporate taxes on the fixed assets of foreign affiliates, and
compare them with estimates from a simple negative binomial regression for
the preferred specification. We then provide, as a robustness check, finite
9Capital stocks are computed by using the perpetual inventory method as in Bergstrand
and Egger (2007).
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mixture models with an alternative specification of the probability equation
and a two-component normal mixture model for the log of fixed assets.
The first column of Table 4.2 presents the results of a negative binomial
regression, disregarding the possibility of latent components in the population
of foreign affiliates. There, the estimated effect of the statutory tax rate
on the fixed assets of the foreign affiliates in our sample is negative but
not statistically significant.10 The remaining 4 columns show the results of
two-component negative binomial mixture models. When we allow for two
latent components in the population, we find that the tax responses differ
significantly across components. Across all specifications, we identify a larger
component associated with a lower conditional mean for fixed assets which
reacts significantly to tax rates, and a smaller one associated with a high
fixed assets mean which seems to be unaffected by corporate taxation. We
associate the first component with the non-shifter group and the second one
with the shifter group. Let us discuss the results for each group in detail.
10Note that, while previous research using the same data-set and a similar regression
technique do find significant tax effects, they do so for a smaller sample of firms than
the one we have here (9,803 parent firms holding 38,705 affiliates in 85 host countries).
Egger and Merlo (2011) find a significant tax effect on the fixed assets at the parent firm
level in a poisson regression including only 6915 parent firms in 51 host countries and
excluding indirectly-held affiliates. While there, the exclusion of indirectly-held affiliates
was necessary, we explicitly want to have them in this analysis.
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The second column shows a model with a constant prior probability of be-
longing to either component. For the non-shifters (84% of the sample),
the estimated semi-elasticity of the statutory corporate tax rate amounts to
−1.95 and is highly significant.11,12 For the shifters, the smaller population
component (about 16% of the sample), the point estimate of the tax vari-
able is also negative, though lower than the estimate for the non-shifters and
statistically insignificant. In this model, the prior probability of belonging
to the non-shifter group is specified as constant. Since we have information
on characteristics that affect that probability, we may let it depend on ob-
servables. The third column shows a model where the probability of being
a non-shifter depends on the number of affiliated enterprises in other coun-
tries, NSISit, and on PSIit, a variable capturing the affiliate-specific tax
incentive to shift profits defined as the average tax rate over all countries
with a lower tax rate in which the firm to which the affiliate belongs has
other affiliated entities. As expected, a higher number of affiliated entities
abroad lowers the probability of being in the non-shifter group, and a higher
average tax rate at the location of such affiliated entreprises (a lower incen-
tive to shift profits) increases the probability of being a non-shifter. Both
effects are highly significant. The non-shifter group is somewhat larger than
in the previous model (89.4% of the sample) and its tax response remains
negative and highly significant. The estimated tax semi-elasticity of -1.85
11In any model with an exponential conditional mean E(y∣x) = exp(x′¯), the regres-
sion coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities since the marginal effect MEk =
E(y∣x)× ¯k, so ¯k = MEk/E(y∣x) (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
12The estimated coefficients of both components are obtained simultaneously through
maximum likelihood estimation using the whole sample. The % of the sample classified
as non-shifters is obtained after estimation using the calculated posterior probability of
belonging to that group (see equation 4.7).
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is lower than in the previous model, but the confidence intervals overlap.
Table 4.3 reports Akaike’s and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria for
the 3 models discussed above. The negative binomial mixture model with
parametrized probability (FMNB) achieves the smaller values, indicating a
better fit. Table 4.3 also reports likelihood ratio tests for the negative bi-
nomial (NB) model against both the negative binomial mixture model with
constant probability (FMNB-CP) and FMNB, and for the FMNB-CP against
the FMNB. In all cases, the null hypothesis of the constrained model being
true can be rejected. The FMNB model, displayed in the third column of
Table 4.2, is thus the preferred model.
Table 4.3: Satistics for Model Selection
Model Log-Likelihood k AIC BIC
NB -604060.60 31 1208183.20 1208498.18
FMNB-CP -562119.50 63 1124365.00 1125005.12
FMNB -560587.48 67 1121308.96 1121989.72
Likelihood-ratio Test
Null Alternative LR-statistic d.f p-value
NB FMNB-CP 83882.20 32 0.000
NB FMNB 86946.24 36 0.000
FMNB-CP FMNB 3064.04 4 0.000
Notes: The statistics refer to the models displayed in the first 3 columns of Table 4.2: the Negative
Binomial (NB), the 2-component Negative Binomial Mixture with constant probability (FMNB-
CP), and the 2-component Negative Binomial Mixture with parametrized probability (FMNB). k
is the number of estimated parameters in each model. AIC is Akaike’s information criteria and
BIC is Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria. The lower part of the table reports likelihood ratio
test for the alternative model against the constrained model.
The two population components differ as well in terms of the parameters of
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the remaining variables. In our preferred specification, the effect of GDPjt
is positive and significant for the non-shifter group but insignificant for the
shifters. The variables KLRATjt and SKILLjt have opposite significant ef-
fects for each group: positive for the larger group of non-shifters and negative
for the shifters. This results are consistent with a prevalence of large-market-
seeking horizontal multinationals – producing the same product at home and
at the host market – in the non-shifter group and a greater presence of ver-
tical multinational firms – producing headquarter services in skill-abundant
countries and goods in skill-scarce economies – among the shifters. Given
that vertically integrated firms may have more opportunities to shift profits
through transfer pricing than horizontal firms, this makes sense. The variable
GDPPCjt, which reflects labor costs, has a positive and significant effect for
both groups. Both a higher inflation rate and higher perceived corruption
have a negative effect on the fixed assets of the non-shifter group but doesn’t
seem to affect the shifters. Table 4.4 reports Wald tests of coefficient equality
across components. The null hypothesis that coefficients across components
are equal can not be rejected for the parameters of the lending rate, the
inflation rate and the financial freedom index. For the rest of the explana-
tory variables, most importantly in the case of the statutory tax rate, the
estimated parameters differ significantly across components.
We can use the predicted posterior probability of belonging to either com-
ponent to classify the individual observations into shifters and non-shifters.
Table 4.5 reports the means of the dependent and explanatory variables for
each component after splitting the sample according to the predictions of our
preferred model. The firms classified as shifters invest an average amount
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Table 4.4: Wald Tests of Coefficient Equality Across Compo-
nents
Parameter Â2 statistic d.f. P-value
CITRjt 3.90 1 0.048
GDPjt 4.65 1 0.031
KLRATjt 8.52 1 0.004
SKILLjt 6.31 1 0.012
GDPPCjt 6.78 1 0.009
LENDjt 0.02 1 0.896
INFLjt 0.68 1 0.411
CPIjt 6.52 1 0.011
FINFRjt 0.46 1 0.497
All coefficients 126.07 29 0.000
Notes: Tests based on the regression displayed in the first two columns of Table 4.2. The test
of joint equality of all coefficients across components includes the individual means and the year
dummies.
of 155 million Euro in fixed assets, while the non-shifters have an average
investment of just 3.65 million Euro. Even though they constitute only 10%
of the sample, shifters account for 83% of the total stock of fixed assets held
abroad by German multinational firms. Shifters have on average 82.6 affili-
ated enterprises of the same parent in other countries, non-shifters only 20.4.
The country-specific explanatory variables, especially the tax measures, show
no significant difference across groups.
From the third column of Table 4.2, we know that the means of the predicted
values of fixed assets amount to 3.54 and 77.38 for non-shifters and shifters,
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Figure 4.1: Predicted mixture densities of fixed assets
respectively. Figure 4.1 shows the predicted mixture densities, and reveals
that the estimated component distributions overlap in a wide range of val-
ues. This highlights the fact that the finite mixture model captures latent
heterogeneity and improves the assessment of differential tax responses that
could be made relying only on a mere grouping of firms according to their
investment levels. Figure 4.2 displays the average investment in fixed assets
by quantiles of the distribution of the corporate tax rate, for non-shifters
and shifters. Two things strike our attention. First, the differences between
average levels of investments across the two components are significant, irre-
spective of the tax rate. Second, shifters seem to invest the most, on average,
in high-tax countries.
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Figure 4.2: Average fixed assets by quantiles of corporate tax rate
The two last regressions presented in Table 4.2 use different tax measures,
EATRjt, the effective average tax rate, and EMTRjt, the effective marginal
tax rate. Although the estimated semi-elasticities for the non-shifters are
lower, the main results remain unchanged. The tax effect is negative and
significant for the larger group with the lower conditional mean, and in-
significant for the smaller group with the higher mean of fixed assets. Given
that we loose observations when using these alternative measures, we pre-
fer the specification with the statutory tax rate CITRjt. Table 4.6 presents
three models with alternative probability specifications and a normal mix-
ture model for the log of fixed assets. Adding variables to the specification of
the probability of being in the non-shifter group does not change the results.
While a higher internal-debt-to-capital ratio lowers, as expected, the proba-
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bility of being a non-shifter, the ownership share of the German parent and
operating in the R&D sector do not seem to have an influence, after control-
ling for the number of affiliated enterprises and the average tax rate at other
locations. Fitting a normal mixture model for the log of fixed assets produces
similar results concerning the tax effects. The estimated semi-elasticity for
the non-shifter amounts here to -2.32 and is highly significant. The tax re-
sponse of the shifter group is now significant at the 10% level, but much lower
(-0.65) than that of the non-shifter group. The difference between both coef-
ficients is statistically significant at the 2% level.13 In this model the group of
non-shifters associated with the lower predicted mean is still larger than the
shifter group but only marginally (51.56% of the sample). The logarithmic
transformation of the dependent variable is to blame. First, in our sample we
have firms with zero fixed assets which are dropped. Second, the distribution
is shifted to the right and observations with high values are brought closer
to each other. Probability mass is shifted from the low-mean group to the
high-mean group.
13The Â2 statistic of the wald test for coefficient equality has a value of 5.17. The null
hypothesis that both coefficients are equal can be rejected at the 2% level.
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Table 4.5: Component Characteristics
Non-shifter Shifter
Observations 171,325 19,791
Affiliates 35,725 5,272
% Sample 89.64 10.36
% of total fixed assets 16.93 83.07
Component means
FixedAssetsit 3.654 155.320
NSISit 20.480 82.630
PSIit 0.277 0.268
IDRit 0.180 0.182
OSit 0.904 0.868
R&Dit 0.003 0.005
CITRjt 0.324 0.330
EATRjt 0.295 0.298
EMTRjt 0.229 0.235
GDPjt 27.484 27.684
KLRATjt 10.563 10.672
SKILLjt 53.269 55.954
GDPPCjt 9.564 9.688
LENDjt 8.664 8.313
INFLjt 3.210 2.973
CPIjt 6.571 6.738
FINFRjt 69.288 70.096
Notes: Classification of observations into non-shifters and
shifters according to the posterior probability of belonging to
the non-shifter group calculated upon the regression displayed
in the third column of Table 4.2. % of total fixed assets refers
to the total of fixed assets of all German affiliates abroad over
all years in the sample (1996-2007).
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Overall, we find evidence for two different groups of firms which react dif-
ferently to corporate taxation. The larger group of firms is unable to shift
profits and is negatively affected by the corporate tax rate. The estimated
tax semi-elasticity for the non-shifter group ranges from -1.85 to -2.32, a
magnitude in line with previous research. The smaller group of firms is able
to shift profits and avoid taxation and shows no significant response to the
corporate tax rate. In our preferred specification a one-percentage-point in-
crease in the statutory tax rate is associated with a decrease by 1.85% in the
stock of fixed assets of a non-shifting foreign affiliate. We can quantify that
effect by evaluating it at the sample mean of the component (see Table 4.5).
The average affiliate classified as non-shifter invests about 3.65 million Euro
in fixed assets. Such an affiliate would reduce its investment in fixed assets
by about 68,000 Euro in response to a one-percentage-point increase in the
corporate tax rate. We may ask what would happen if countries were able
to prevent all profit shifting. Under the assumption that the firms in the
shifter group can no longer shift profits and exhibit the same tax elasticity
as the non-shifters, the implied effect given the average investment size of the
shifters of about 155 million Euro would be 2.88 million Euro per percentage
point tax increase.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the tax responsiveness of multinationals’ investment
decisions in foreign countries, distinguishing firms that are able to shift profits
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(shifters) from those that are not (non-shifters). From a theoretical point
of view, the tax responsiveness of firms crucially depends on this distinction.
Empirically, however, whether or not a firm is able to shift profits is basically
unobserved.
We use a finite mixture model to distinguish the tax responsiveness of invest-
ments made by foreign affiliates which are able shift profits and reduce their
tax base from that of affiliates which are not able to do so and are thus fully
taxed. Using a panel of 38,705 foreign affiliates of German multinationals
over the years 1996 to 2007, we show that while shifters do not respond to
host-country taxes at all, taxes significantly affect the investment decision of
non-shifters. We identify a larger group of affiliates with a relatively low av-
erage investment which is negatively affected by the local corporate tax rate
on profits. The estimated tax effect for the latter group amounts to 1.85%
less fixed assets, or 68,000 Euro for the average affiliate, per percentage point
tax increase. A smaller group of affiliates is able to avoid taxation by shifting
its tax base and shows no significant response to corporate tax rates. The
affiliates in this group have significatively higher investments in fixed assets,
so that, were they to be prevented from shifting profits, the implied effect
in Euro of a one-percentage-point change in the tax rate would be 42 times
higher.
To the extent that a considerable proportion of a country’s foreign invest-
ments are carried out by firms that shift profits, the introduction of anti-
tax-avoidance measures to restrict profit shifting in the pursuit to cash tax
revenue will come at the cost of entering in tax competition with other coun-
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tries for that firms’ investments. In fact, the broadening of the tax base has
to be accompanied by a policy of cutting the statutory tax burden to avoid
losing real economic activity.
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selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen di-
rekt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sowie mir gegebene Anregungen
sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen
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